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This work attempts to focus on the human side of Skylab, America’s first space station, 
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INTRODUCTION 
When President Dwight Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act on 
July 29, 1958, he officially created one of the largest and most influential government agencies 
of the United States.  Through this act, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
[NASA] replaced the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics [NACA] and changed the 
focus from aeronautics to space exploration.1  The creation of NASA came almost directly as a 
response to the launch of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957.  At this time, the 
United States and the Soviet Union were embroiled in the Cold War, a major post-Second World 
War struggle between the democratic and communist nations.  After the launch of this first 
satellite, the United States people felt threatened by the possibility of space being dominated by 
their rivals.  This brought about the need for NASA.  The two nations began the virtually 
unstated but ever present “Space Race” to reach the Moon and conquer space. 
The Soviet Union, with its early start, boasted much of the early “firsts” in space travel.  
On November 3, 1957, Laika, a dog, became the first living thing to orbit the Earth.  Yuri 
Gagarin was the first human in space on April 12, 1961, a major victory in the space race.  
Alexei Leonov completed the first space walk on March 18, 1965.  While the Russians first 
achieved a number of other accomplishments, NASA was only months behind.  NASA truly took 
the lead in 1968, when the astronauts of Apollo VIII became the first humans to reach and orbit 
the Moon.    
The agency began with rather meager goals.  The Mercury Project, with flights from 
1961 to 1963, simply wanted to prove that humans could reach space consistently with one-man 
missions.2  With the Gemini Program, from 1964 to 1966, NASA slightly expanded its goals.  
This time each mission would include two astronauts who would demonstrate tasks, such as 
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rendezvous and Extravehicular Activities [EVAs or space walks], that were necessary for 
missions to the Moon.3  These first two programs led NASA to a much larger objective.    
On May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy delivered what would become the most 
important speech in NASA’s brief history.  Before a joint session of Congress, Kennedy declared 
that “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before the decade is 
out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth.”4  A year later, on 
September 29, 1962, at Rice University in Houston, Texas, a city which soon would be home of 
the Manned Spacecraft Center, Kennedy outlined the immediate future of the space program.   
We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are 
easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the 
best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we will accept, one we 
are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win, and the others, too.5 
 
Later in the speech, he reiterated that “this will be done in the decade of the Sixties.”   
Gene Kranz calls Kennedy’s challenge a “marvelous piece of timing” because it gave NASA a 
goal to conquer and truly placed them at the heart of the Cold War struggle.6  Of course, 
President Kennedy’s prophetic words ultimately came true when Neil Armstrong set foot on the 
Moon July 20, 1969, during Apollo XI, effectively ending the space race. 
Even before this, and certainly during the Apollo program [1967-1972], another concern 
loomed in the back of many NASA officials’ minds: what follows landing on the Moon?  What 
could possibly live up to the awe and grandeur of reaching another celestial body?  From early 
on, the answer to this question was a space station.  In fact, one can trace the idea of a space 
station back to a story by Edward E. Hale published in 1869-1870.7  Since then, many 
incarnations have surfaced. The most outspoken proponent for an American space station was 
Wernher von Braun, the premier rocket scientist of his day. 
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Why did NASA conduct the Skylab program?  Skylab was America’s first and, so far, 
only space station.  One can say this with conviction since the International Space Station [ISS] 
is, in fact, an international cooperation, albeit run mostly by the United States.  Skylab was also 
NASA’s first endeavor dedicated primarily as a science and research mission in space.  Certainly 
some of the goals in the Mercury and Gemini missions pertained to science, but for the most 
part, NASA used them only as a precursor to Apollo.  For all the scientific output of Apollo, the 
main goal simply was to send men to the Moon and return home safely.  The Apollo program 
was so operations oriented, that some NASA employees thought that the scientists were an 
afterthought.8  The Soviet Union attempted a number of smaller Salyut space stations from 1971 
to 1986, but Skylab could be seen as the major effort in long-duration space travel until the 
Russian Mir station in 1986. 
When NASA decided to accept scientist-astronauts beginning in 1964, the culture of 
space exploration may have changed forever.  No longer would all astronauts be test pilots who 
could learn some rudimentary science.  Now some would be scientists who could be taught to 
fly.  A “significant” change occurred between Apollo and Skylab because of these new 
astronauts.9  Neil Hutchinson, a flight director during Skylab, believed the scientist-astronauts 
changed the idea of an astronaut, and indeed, even brought more involvement with outside 
scientists to future programs.10  Due to these new astronauts, and the nature of the workshop, 
Skylab allowed NASA to truly research life sciences in space for the first time.11  The inclusion 
of scientists to the astronaut corps precipitated this major paradigm shift in NASA’s thinking 
from exploration to science.    
Despite the fact that engineers and scientists had contemplated the possibility of a space 
station for decades, one would hardly think that the program that became Skylab could live up to 
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the notoriety and prestige of missions to the Moon.  In fact, history suggests that only missions to 
another body, such as Mars, could gain as much attention and praise, as well as monetary 
support.  Numerous members of NASA even looked down on Skylab as a waste of time and 
energy.  Some, such as John G. DeFife, an engineer in the Flight Technology Office, considered 
himself “left behind” when he had to work on Skylab, while others moved on to the seemingly 
more exciting new Space Shuttle.  In fact, he felt as though “Skylab was sort of a bitter time in 
my NASA career.”12  While certainly not all of NASA agreed with these sentiments, the fact that 
this attitude was present, along with other evidence, led some  to the conclusion that Skylab 
seemed to be the most forgotten mission. 
Historians and authors have devoted a considerable amount of research to the Mercury 
missions.  The public’s love affair with NASA’s first space program continued especially with 
The Right Stuff written by Tom Wolfe in 1979 and the movie of the same name directed by 
Philip Kaufman in 1983.  The Apollo program is arguably the most popular and most written-
about space program, as evidenced by the myriad of publications on the missions and the 1995 
box-office hit Apollo 13 directed by Ron Howard.  Even a 1998 HBO documentary miniseries 
From the Earth to the Moon dealt extensively with the Apollo program.  Certainly the more 
recent space shuttle and International Space Station receive their share of public and media 
awareness.  Even the Gemini program received more scholarly research than Skylab.  Overall, 
perhaps only the Apollo-Soyuz Test Program [ASTP] has received as little notice as the Skylab 
program. 
Even so, a fair amount of information is available on Skylab, if one searches in the 
correct places.  By combining the resources of the handful of books and periodical articles, one 
notices a predominance of scientific and research information.  But what of the men who made 
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these missions possible?  While the science and space research are clearly important and the 
main goal of the missions, these would not be possible without the men and women who worked 
on the Skylab program.  Therefore, one can take a more comprehensive look at the human 
elements of Skylab only after combining the resources and sifting out the immense amount of 




While the idea of space travel and a space station had surfaced in science fiction writings 
for decades, one can trace the reality of this technology back only to post-World War II.  
Germany employed many of the most brilliant minds of the time to create the first rockets used 
during the Second World War.  The United States government later brought many of these same 
men to America to work on rockets. They formed the basis of NASA. 
In 1958, NASA was born as the nation was cultivating its interest in space travel.  In June 
1959, Wernher von Braun of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency unveiled his Project Horizon to 
use a spent booster stage as the base for a station, an idea later referred to as the “wet-stage” [or 
wet-workshop] concept.1  The wet-workshop called for astronauts to dock with an already used 
booster stage in orbit.  They would then use materials to build a space station inside that stage.  
Over the years von Braun continually fought for his space station idea, and eventually saw it 
come to fruition. 
The next major step in the formation of a space station came the following year in 1960.  
Douglas Aircraft Company built a full-size model of a proposed four-man, wet-workshop station.  
Housed in Empire Hall in London, it was sixty-two feet [nineteen meters] high and seventeen 
feet [five meters] across.2  Not only was this a chance for developers to see their ideas in three 
dimensions, it also was a great publicity tactic to interest the public in such a concept.  By 
building this model, engineers and lay people alike could more easily visualize what previously 
had been only a completely imaginary and inconceivable idea.  Instead this now made it much 
more realistic and possible. 
The idea of an American space station was stalled, however, on July 5, 1960, when the 
House Committee on Science and Applications stated that the goal of putting a man on the Moon 
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in the 1960’s was a higher priority for the nation.3  This was later compounded by the more 
public and more influential speech to the same effect by President John F. Kennedy on May 25, 
1961 at Rice University, as cited above.  Both of these actions, while committing a large sum of 
money and national prestige toward the space program and in particular the missions to the 
Moon, destined the space station to a less prominent role.  While NASA still allocated some 
resources to researching possibilities for long-duration missions, the vast majority of time, talent, 
and funding went to the space race to the Moon.  Consequently, few developments would come 
about in this area until the government and NASA paid more attention to programs outside of 
Apollo. 
One advancement came on March 1, 1963, when officials of the Manned Spacecraft 
Center [MSC] in Houston, Texas, proposed an idea for a space station using Apollo parts.  This 
station would have a capacity of eighteen astronauts.4  Three months later, MSC awarded two 
contracts to study the feasibility of a station, one to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the other 
to Douglas Aircraft Company.5  Other minor events occurred during this time, but again the 
focus of attention at NASA was on reaching the Moon. 
While some developments in NASA were surfacing on the idea of a space station, the 
United States Air Force [USAF] announced on December 10, 1963, its plans for a Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory [MOL] in conjunction with NASA.  This plan would use modified Gemini 
capsules in a combined fifty-four foot [16.5 meter] long research laboratory.  The missions could 
last up to thirty days but not be resupplied or reused.  Also, while they would not use any civilian 
astronauts as NASA had, the selection process and qualifications would be similar to NASA’s 
astronaut corps.6  Certainly, people outside of NASA noticed the military potential of near-Earth 
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orbit stations. While this particular plan did not ultimately come to realization, one can attribute 
some important advancements of the Skylab program to the USAF MOL. 
Later, a group of twenty individuals comprising the Space Medicine Advisory Group 
[SMAG] met eight times between January and August 1964 to discuss such elements as life-
support, experiments, and design requirements for the proposed NASA station.  SMAG proposed 
that 30- and 90-day missions were too short to study and examine adequately the long-term 
effects of microgravity and space in general on the human body.  In fact, SMAG stated that the 
mission should last at least one year in continuous orbit, rather than in the series of shorter 
missions proposed by the MOL program.7  Two specific findings from this study would later 
directly affect the Skylab program.  First, the SMAG group argued for the necessity of an 
emergency contingency that could rescue the crew in the case of a crisis.  They also suggested a 
simulation on the ground before the actual missions in space to test the equipment and to 
understand better the needs of a crew isolated for so long.8  Similar other groups would, over 
time, present ideas to aid the formation of a space station.  While some were more influential 
than others, the very existence of such organizations substantiate that this idea was always 
important, even if not in the national spotlight. 
Around this time, the Marshall Space Flight Center [MSFC] in Huntsville, Alabama, 
began to incorporate von Braun’s old idea of a wet-workshop space station into the Apollo 
program by testing the feasibility of using Apollo systems to build a space station.  This fact 
greatly irked many of the officials at MSC in Houston,9 because they did not like the idea of the 
Marshall Center gaining a more prominent role in what they saw as their niche in NASA.  Some 
of these animosities would expand later in the Skylab program.  On July 30, 1965, the Apollo 
Extension System [AES] began researching the idea of using many smaller pieces to build a 
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bigger station than NASA could make with just one piece, a concept that would later be adopted 
by Russia’s Mir station and the International Space Station.10  This illustrates NASA’s habit of 
revisiting ideas that had originated at earlier points and using them in later programs.  On 
September 21, 1965, NASA Administrator James Webb advised AAP planners to be as flexible 
as possible, especially at this early stage in development.11   
The year 1965 also witnessed the formation of the Apollo Applications Program [AAP], 
an American space station.  AAP eventually became Skylab.  The following year saw the first 
mention of the Apollo Telescope Mount [ATM],12 which, as a major solar observatory, would 
eventually play a vital role in the Skylab program.  On March 23, 1966, NASA announced the 
first, rather ambitious, AAP schedule, with a total of forty-five launches including nineteen 
Saturn V rockets and twenty-six Saturn 1B rockets.  While the ultimate schedule would 
absolutely depend on the completion of the Apollo program, the NASA Administration 
originally planned the first launch for April of 1968.13  Eventually, they greatly reduced and 
continuously pushed back the final schedule.  One can, however, discern NASA’s ambition for a 
challenging schedule for the space station in these early planning days. 
NASA set the roles of the centers of its operations on the proposed station on August 13-
15, 1966.  MSFC was in charge of the living quarters and lab components, while MSC would 
handle mission operations, as usual.  Both, however, would also concern themselves with the 
scientific experiments to be conducted on various missions, depending on the make-up of each 
experiment.  Meanwhile, the center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, would handle the payload 
integration and launch facilities as it had during the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs.14  
All would have to deal with a continuously shrinking budget.  The roles of each center would 
 10
remain relatively the same throughout the program, and each learned to work cooperatively in 
order to complete the mission successfully. 
In the next few years, NASA integrated some new concepts into the program.  To begin 
with, on June 1, 1967, Deke Slayton, then head of astronaut selection, and Chris Kraft, a lead 
flight director, together announced the plan to first launch the unmanned portion of the station.  
Later, if the station functioned, NASA would launch the manned missions to the already orbiting 
station.15  This, of course, would eventually happen.  Perhaps this saved the program, as 
evidenced later by the almost catastrophic events shortly after launch of the unmanned station.  
Also, in mid-November, NASA reintroduced the originally rejected dry-workshop concept.  This 
idea was to launch an unfuelled and pre-manufactured station, instead of using an already used 
Saturn V section for a station that the astronauts would have to build on-orbit.16  Eventually, this 
dry-workshop would clearly become more feasible, easier, and less expensive.  Almost two years 
later, in May of 1969, both Wernher von Braun and Robert Gilruth, then Director of the Manned 
Spacecraft Center in Houston, recommended the dry-workshop over the wet-workshop.17  
Between 1966 and 1970, NASA was trying to work out the details of Skylab, including whether 
to use the dry- or the wet-workshop concepts and the responsibilities of the different centers.  
This time has been referred to as the “growing pains” of Skylab.18  Finally, on July 18, the new 
NASA administrator, Tom Paine, officially approved the dry-workshop space station.19  Simply 
put, due to the number of necessary launches and other impracticalities, the wet-workshop idea 
was not as feasible as the dry-workshop.20  In a relatively short period of time, the basis of the 
station completely changed.  Certainly, this was due to the overwhelming amount of advantages 
of the dry-workshop as well as the influential members backing the idea.  This significantly 
changed the mission for the better and helped the mission work within the ever-shrinking budget. 
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Over this period of time NASA continuously updated the amount of launches as well as 
the schedule for them.  In December 1966, NASA scheduled the first launch for June 1968 with 
a total of fifteen Saturn V and twenty-two Saturn 1B launches.21  The tragic accident of Apollo 1, 
with the deaths of astronauts Virgil “Gus” Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee on 
January 27, 1967, would greatly change the future missions.  In May 1967, NASA pushed back 
the initial launch to at least “early 1969.”22  Two months later, the AAP was down to seven 
Saturn V and seventeen Saturn 1B rockets, with the first launch no earlier than March 1970.23  In 
December, NASA again delayed the launch to April 1970 with three of each Saturn rocket 
used.24  NASA revised the schedule once again on June 4, 1968, with the first launch set for 
November 1970 and with a new lineup of only one Saturn V but eleven Saturn 1B rockets.25  On 
July 22, 1969, NASA moved the launch date to July 1972, and reduced the total number of 
launches to only four.26  Perhaps these many changes stemmed from the fact that the budget for 
this project continually decreased, and the schedules and guidelines had to reflect those 
decreases.  It surely was an ever-evolving, flexible program. 
On February 17, 1970, NASA officially renamed the Apollo Applications Project as 
Skylab.  The name had been proposed in 1968 by Donald L. Steelman, but the administration 
waited to change the name due to budgetary reasons.27  The new name, presumably, was 
supposed to give the program more credibility and give those involved a better sense of their 
mission.  Also that year, the NASA Administration announced the first full schedule.  The 
unmanned workshop would launch November 9, 1972, followed by the first crew the next day 
for a 28-day mission.  The second crew would launch January 19, 1973, for a 56-day mission, 
and NASA scheduled the final crew May 1, 1973, for another 56-day mission.28  In April 1971, 
NASA rescheduled the launches for April 30, 1973, followed by the first crew May 1, the second 
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crew July 30, and the final crew October 28, 1973.29  Yet again, NASA announced on April 5, 
1973, the seemingly final change.  The unmanned mission, named SL-1, would launch May 14, 
1973.  The next day, the first crew, SL-2, would follow and would return on June 12.  The 
second crew, SL-3, would launch August 8th and return October 3.  NASA scheduled the third 
and final crew, SL-4,  for launch November 9, with reentry expected on January 4, 1974.30   
While the launch schedule would again change due to unforeseen events, this 
announcement would finally mark the actual date for the initial launch of the unmanned Skylab 
space station.  These many changes highlight the very flexible nature of NASA.  Numerous 
events led to each delay, some more critical than others.  All the while, one can see that NASA 
was striving to find the best, most efficient time to initiate these missions.  These many changes 




In the early years of NASA, the Administration determined astronaut selection based on 
what the agency needed in the immediate future.  Each group filled a certain need.  For instance, 
the very first group, the Original Seven, consisted completely of test pilots to fly the Mercury 
capsules.  Not one of these Original Seven, however, flew on Skylab. 
Pete Conrad had the longest tenure of any Skylab astronaut (Table 1 lists the Skylab 
astronauts).  From the Next Nine (the second group of astronauts selected September 17, 1962) 
came Lieutenant Charles “Pete” Conrad, Jr.1  On October 17, 1963, NASA selected “The 
Fourteen,” the third group of astronauts.  This saw the inclusion of future Skylab astronaut 
Lieutenant Alan L. Bean.2  After these selections, there was a hiatus in the selection of new 
astronauts.  Those already in the corps would easily fill all slots needed for the foreseeable 
future.  Conrad flew two Gemini missions and commanded Apollo 12, whose crew also included 
Alan Bean.3  Both astronauts were, therefore, the only two experienced astronauts who flew on 
Skylab.  They each had important knowledge for these missions, for just being in space was 
more experience than the others had gained.  This enabled them to successfully command their 
Skylab crews. 
TABLE 1: Skylab Astronauts 
Name Qualification Group 
Lt. Charles Conrad Jr. USN Next Nine 
Lt. Alan L. Bean USN The Fourteen 
Dr. Owen K. Garriott PhD, electrical engineering Scientist 
Dr. Edward G. Gibson PhD, physics Scientist 
Lt. Cmdr. Joseph P. Kerwin, MD USN Scientist 
Maj. Gerald P. Carr USMC Original Nineteen 
Capt. Jack R. Lousma USMC Original Nineteen 
Maj. William R. Pogue USAF Original Nineteen 
Lt. Cmdr. Paul J. Weitz USN Original Nineteen 
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NASA decided that they needed to include more candidates into astronaut selection.  The 
idea was to include scientists, instead of just pilots, so that more useful scientific contributions 
could result from both missions to the Moon and any future missions.  On October 19, 1964, 
NASA officially announced its search for those scientist-astronauts.  The criteria included that 
the applicant must have been born after August 1, 1930, a United States citizen, no taller than 6 
feet, and hold a PhD in natural sciences, medicine, or engineering.  NASA also expressed a 
preference for previous flight experience, although that was by no means necessary.4  Following 
a long selection process, an announcement of the candidates came June 28, 1965.  Included in 
this group of scientist-astronauts were Dr. Owen K. Garriott, Dr. Edward G. Gibson, and 
Lieutenant Commander Joseph P. Kerwin, MD.5  These three scientists would form the core of 
the Skylab astronauts whose scientific input would set their missions apart from previous 
missions. 
The planned USAF MOL station had its own selection of military officers.  MOL 
astronauts had to have a BS degree and have graduated from the Aerospace Research Pilot 
School at Edwards Air Force Base, California.6  When they cut their own program, the USAF 
asked NASA if the agency would accept any of the astronauts.  NASA accepted some of them on 
April 4, 1966, as part of the “Original Nineteen.”   These included among them future Skylab 
astronauts Major Gerald P. Carr, Captain Jack R. Lousma, Major William R. Pogue, and 
Lieutenant Commander Paul J. Weitz.7  The largest number of participating astronauts came 
from this group.  This probably stems from their time of selection, for astronauts from earlier 
classes had already filled almost all the Apollo program slots.  When it came time to find jobs for 
these men, the office working on the space station became the easiest target for most of them.  
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Their time in the office and lack of earlier flights made them the most likely candidates for 
filling spots to fly on Skylab missions. 
Interestingly, all but two of the Skylab astronauts were military personnel.  Of course, the 
majority of civilian astronauts did not fly until the space shuttle, which allowed more astronauts 
to fly.  Each group filled a certain need, but the qualifications stayed relatively the same 





The nine astronauts who lived on Skylab each has his own history.1  Seven of the nine 
served in the military before joining NASA, four of whom came from the Navy.  The other two 
astronauts held PhDs. 
The nine men came from very diverse backgrounds.  The majority asserted that they were 
always interested in flying.  Some were scientifically inclined.  Despite these differences, their 
lives converged while working at the same place trying to accomplish the same goal. 
Captain Charles “Pete” Conrad, Jr., was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on June 2, 
1930.2  His family was well off, and in 1936 he began attending the prestigious Haverford 
School.3  Due to his undetected dyslexia and failing grades in history and English, he was not 
asked to return to Haverford for the 1947-1948 school year, and instead transferred to Darrow, a 
less prestigious boarding school.4  This may have benefited him in the long run, however, 
because the headmaster of Darrow helped Conrad get accepted to Princeton University on a full 
Navy scholarship.5  He was one of seven new students to first declare Aeronautical Engineering 
as a major.  In fact, it would prove to be a perfect fit for him since Princeton and Cal Tech were 
chosen to house jet-propulsion laboratories.6  He graduated from Princeton on June 16, 1953.7 
Even from an early age Conrad was naturally curious about mechanical devices.  During 
the summer of 1946, he began working at an airfield near the family home, and it was here that 
he found his calling to be an aviator.8  He proved to be a quick study, and on August 22, 1947, 
Pete Conrad completed his first solo flight.9 After college, he began his tour with the United 
States Navy.  In 1958, he was transferred to Patuxent River, the home of the Navy’s test pilots.10  
Shortly thereafter, Conrad was selected to apply to be one of the first Mercury astronauts.  He 
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grew tired of the tests, however, and on the eleventh day he walked out after throwing a full 
enema bag on the desk of the commander of the Lovelace Clinic, where tests were held.11  
Conrad began to regret his decision on May 5, 1961, when he saw Alan Shepard become 
the first American to fly in space.12  After some persuasion by a friend, he applied again, and 
NASA finally accepted him into the astronaut corps on September 17, 1962, as part of the “Next 
Nine”.13  His first space flight began on August 21, 1965, with Gordon Cooper on Gemini V.14   
He would later refer to Gemini V as “eight days floating in a garbage can.”15  He also flew 
another Gemini mission (Gemini XI) and commanded Apollo XII before joining the first Skylab 
crew as their commander.   
While living in Oak Park, Illinois, Lieutenant Commander Joseph P. Kerwin, MD, born 
February 19, 1932, became fascinated with science fiction at an early age.16  After graduating 
from Holy Cross College with a Bachelor of Arts in philosophy and a pre-med minor, he 
attended medical school at Northwestern University.  The Navy drafted him in early 1958, and 
he began his instruction to be a flight surgeon.17  Since he had at least a small amount of pilot 
training, this helped when he applied to NASA to be a scientist-astronaut.18  He did work as 
Capsule Communicator or CapCom for a number of flights before his assignment as the scientist 
of the first Skylab crew. 
Lieutenant Commander Paul J. Weitz, was born on July 25, 1932, in Erie, Pennsylvania.  
He wanted to be a Naval aviator from an early age, following in the footsteps of his dad, a World 
War II veteran.  Before joining NASA, he met fellow future NASA employees Alan Bean, Jack 
Lousma, Eugene Cernan, and Ron Evans, inside connections who may have helped him gain 
acceptance into the astronaut corps.  While becoming an astronaut was not one of his main goals, 
he confessed that he applied since it had the potential to be better than his current job in the 
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Navy.19  Weitz joined NASA as part of the Original Nineteen as one formerly in the MOL group.  
He served as the pilot of the first Skylab crew, completing the group with Conrad and Kerwin.  
Thus, the first crew, SL-2, consisted of an all Navy crew. 
Growing up in Wheeler, Texas, Lieutenant Alan L. Bean, born March 15, 1932, said that 
he always wanted to be a pilot because he strove to be brave.20  In high school he joined the 
Naval Air Reserve to begin his involvement with airplanes.21  He received a Naval ROTC 
[Reserve Officer Training Corps] scholarship and used that to attend the University of Texas in 
Austin.  While there, he studied aeronautical engineering to go along with his interest in flying.22  
Once in the Navy, he became a test pilot partially because it was the most daring assignment, but 
also because it offered him greater variety in experiences and challenges.  Similarly, he applied 
to NASA because he felt the astronaut program would provide the next step in a logical career 
progression.23  Bean was selected in “The Fourteen” group in October 1963.  His first true 
NASA assignment was as backup commander to Gemini X with Clifton Williams.24  Towards 
the end of the Gemini program he transferred, somewhat unwillingly, to the Apollo Applications 
Program, the precursor to Skylab.25  After the untimely death of Clifton Williams, who had been 
scheduled to fly on Apollo XII, Pete Conrad chose Bean to be his lunar module pilot.26  He flew 
on Apollo XII and walked on the Moon with Conrad, making them the third and fourth men to 
do so.  This unique experience certainly helped him gain the renown needed to become the 
commander of the second Skylab crew. 
Dr. Owen K. Garriott, born in Enid, Oklahoma on November 22, 1930, was also 
interested in space from an early age.  While he did join the NROTC,27 he stayed in school to 
attain his PhD in electrical engineering rather than join the service.  His love for space never 
died, however, and he trained to secure his pilot license in an attempt to try to help his chances of 
 19
acceptance by NASA.28  Garriott was admitted in the scientist-astronaut group.  Even though he 
did have his pilot license, he still had to go directly to flight school with the military in order to 
get his wings to become a true astronaut.29  After this flight training, he, like many others, 
worked in different offices within NASA before learning that he was selected to fly as the 
scientist in the second Skylab manned mission. 
Captain Jack R. Lousma, like many other astronauts, envisioned himself flying from an 
early age.30  Lousma was born in Grand Rapids, Michigan on February 29, 1936.  After college, 
he joined the Marines only because both the Air Force and the Navy did not accept married 
pilots.  As a unique way of applying to NASA, Lousma responded to a newspaper advertisement 
by NASA saying they were looking for new pilots.31  Lousma joined the team as part of the 
Original Nineteen astronauts.  Skylab was his first time in space.  He acted as pilot, joining Bean, 
the commander, and Garriott, the scientist. 
Major Gerald P. Carr, born August 22, 1932, had interests in technology and aviation 
since he was a young boy growing up in Santa Ana, California.32  As a result, he joined the 
Marines with the ambition of becoming an aviator in the mid-1960’s.33  In 1965, he applied to 
NASA simply to see how far he could get in the process.34  To his surprise, he was selected as 
another member of the Original Nineteen.  Interestingly, Carr’s goal was not to become an 
astronaut, unlike many of the others.35  He simply applied because the opportunity arose.  
Surprisingly, he was accepted.  As another surprise to many in the NASA community, the 
Administration chose Carr as the rookie commander of the third Skylab mission, leading an all-
rookie crew, the first since Gemini.  This announcement of Carr leading an all-rookie crew upset 
at least one astronaut.  Walter Cunningham, who had worked in the AAP office since 1968 and 
had flown on Apollo VII, left NASA after he learned that he would not fly on any of the 
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missions and had not received the third commander position.36  Those in charge of the selection, 
especially Deke Slayton, must have found some particular qualities and skills  that they 
discerned uniquely favorable about Carr and the other rookies. 
Born on November 8, 1936, Dr. Edward G. Gibson was extremely interested in science, 
especially astronomy, from his elementary school days in Buffalo, New York.37  While he was a 
graduate student at Cal Tech, on his way to a PhD in physics, Gibson closely followed the first 
NASA programs of Mercury and Gemini.38  When the scientist-astronaut application time 
arrived, it seemed a perfect fit for the astronomy enthusiast.  Gibson joined NASA only after 
accomplishing flight training with some of the other scientist-astronauts, a time he said was very 
difficult with “a steep learning curve.”39  Gibson became the third scientist to fly on Skylab.  His 
physics and astronomy background proved invaluable to the solar observations of the mission. 
Major William R. Pogue, born January 23, 1930 in Okeman, Oklahoma, was another 
young boy  “fascinated by aircraft.”  Pogue, one of the older men in the group, actually started 
flying during the Korean War with the intention of becoming a teacher.40  Then, in the mid-
1950’s, a new group of high-performance flyers called the Thunderbirds began touring the 
nation.  Fascinated, Pogue became one of the lucky few who took part as one of these most 
skilled pilots.41  He also followed the space race very closely.42  When an opportunity became 
apparent, he applied and was accepted into NASA.  Pogue entered with the Original Nineteen, 
and worked in the NASA offices until selected as the pilot of the third Skylab mission, joining 
the all-rookie crew of Carr, Gibson, and Pogue.  Despite their calculated selection, the all-rookie 
status of this crew received greater critical scrutiny during and after their flight than the other 
crews, since questionable and unseasoned judgement calls reflected in their mission. 
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The astronauts of Skylab hailed from a wide variety of backgrounds, from different areas 
of the country.  Most expressed an early interest in either space or flight, and they pursued this 
interest in their careers.  Some, like Kerwin and Weitz, actually knew some NASA astronauts 
before their selection; this may have helped their application process.  One thing is certain: 
despite their various histories, they all believed in their mission and worked together as a team 




NASA moved mission control to Houston from Cape Canaveral in 1965 to support the 
first EVA by Ed White during Gemini V.  The Mission Operations Control Room [MOCR] used 
for Skylab in 1973-1974 looked much the same as it had during the previous missions controlled 
from Houston.  The following layout is from the vantage point of looking from the front of the 
room to the back viewing area.1 
The first row was known by the men of mission control as “the trench.”  It consisted of 
Guidance, Flight Dynamics, and a rotating position from left to right.  The Guidance Officer 
[GUIDO] maintained most of the onboard computers.  This console had more relevance than 
before because of the ATM computers.2 The Flight Dynamics Officer [FIDO] detail worked 
mostly with orbital affairs and the reentry.  He only had to report once a day to check the orbit.3  
The final area contained the Launch Vehicle officer [LV] during the launch, an EVA specialist 
during EVAs, or the EREP [Earth Resources Experiment Package] officer while it was in use. 
The second row has been called the “Systems” row.  From left to right, it included the 
Electrical personnel, a different Guidance officer, the Experiments officer, and Medical 
Operations.  The Electrical, General Instrumentaion, and Life Support System [EGIL] position 
had previously been known as the Electrical, Environmental and Communications [EECOM] 
officer.  As might be expected, they monitored the electrical, environmental, and instrumentation 
systems of the workshop and the CSM [Command/Service Module].  Next to them was the 
Guidance, Navigation and Control System [GNS or GNC] engineer who dealt with guidance and 
navigation of the workshop and CSM.  The Experiments officer [EXP] dealt mostly with those 
experiments not under the heading of ATM, EREP, or Medical.  Finally, the Medical Operations 
officer [MED OPS] evaluated all medical activities. 
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The third row was more of a command row, including the Network controller, CapCom, 
Flight Director, Operations and Procedure, and Communications.  First, the Network controller 
[NETWORK] covered the ground systems.  CapCom, formerly short for Capsule Communicator, 
was one of the backup astronauts who acted as the voice of mission control to the astronauts in 
space.  The Flight Director [FLIGHT] was in charge of all aspects of the mission.  His job was to 
“take any actions needed for crew safety and mission success.”4  The Operations and Procedures 
officer [O&P] managed mission control procedures and data from Skylab.  SKYCOM, or the 
Skylab Communications engineer, maintained all communications to the workshop.  This 
position, previously known as the Instrumentation and Communication Officer [INCO] gained 
prominence with the addition of the teleprinter.5    
The final row consisted of the Department of Defense console, Headquarters 
representative, Flight Operations Director, and the Public Affairs Officer.  A representative of 
the Department of Defense [DoD] coordinated support for the mission such as pickup after 
splashdown.  The Headquarters management representative [HQTRS] acted as an on-site liaison.  
The Flight Operations Director [FOD] provided an interface between mission control and the 
program managers from other centers.  The FODs, Eugene Kranz and M.P. Frank, worked 
twelve-hour shifts throughout the program to continuously man the console.  Since they had 
previously served as flight directors, they could also step in if a flight director could not work 
due to illness or another reason.6  PAO, or Public Affairs Officer, kept the media informed of 
mission details.  PAO also served as the “voice of mission control” to the public. 
Four teams of controllers worked three shifts a day for the first flight.  NASA added a 
fifth team after the first mission to make the job easier on the flight controllers over the longer 
missions.  A flight director led each team.  Eugene Kranz, the manager of the flight directors at 
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that time, chose Milton Windler, Charles “Chuck” Lewis, Neil Hutchinson, and Don Puddy as 
the first four flight directors.  Phil Shaffer led the fifth team.7  Windler had been a flight director 
since Apollo 8, but the other four were selected shortly before Apollo 16 so they could receive 
some education and on-the-job training before the end of the Apollo program.  Since he had the 
most experience, Kranz had Windler transfer from Apollo over to Skylab before the end of the 
Moon missions.  He next had Puddy move over so that he could work on training for the 
activation of the workshop.  Hutchinson began working on Skylab shortly followed by the final 
two, Lewis and Shaffer.8  Windler had worked recovery operations on Mercury, Gemini, and 
Apollo before his transition to flight director.9  Lewis had been a remote site CapCom during the 
Mercury Program, while the other three worked in mission control: Shaffer as a Trajectory 
officer, Puddy as TELMU [Telemetry, Electrical, EVA Mobility Unit Officer], and Hutchinson 
as GNC.10  Each had his own specialty which he carried into the Skylab program. 
Each team had its own personality, due mostly to the differing personalities of the flight 
directors.  They also each had a team color, a NASA tradition from the start.  Windler led 
Maroon Team, Lewis Bronze Team, Hutchinson Silver Team, Puddy Crimson Team, and Shaffer 
Purple Team.11  Some of the teams also had mascots or other forms of individualism.  Lewis’ 
team adopted “Splash Gordon,” a fish in one of the on board experiments.  Hutchinson’s team 
adopted Arabella the spider, another creature from an experiment.  Puddy had polka dots because 
of his many polka-dot shirts, while Shaffer had stripes.12  Usually when the team began on 
console, they would somehow portray their team’s significance on the screens at the front of the 
room.  Each day during a mission, the controllers played wake-up music when the crew 
awakened.  Puddy’s team at one point had their own unique song, “Paralyzed,” by The 
Legendary Stardust Cowboy.  This song so irritated the crew that they pleaded the controllers to 
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shut it off.13  Mission Control made these gestures to try to bond the team and in some cases to 
help reduce the boredom that can come from a long-duration mission. 
During the missions, three teams worked eight hour shifts while the other teams had 
some time off.14  During the day, the execution shift completed mission goals with the crew.  The 
night shift planned the coming days.  The midnight and early morning shift worked procedures 
and readied the flight plan for the day’s execution.15  While most controllers seemingly did not 
have a problem with the scheduling, at least one did mention that Kranz set the rotation 
backwards as compared to other shift schedules.  In other words, teams would rotate from the 
execution shift to the midnight shift, rather than the other way around.16            
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FROM APOLLO TO SKYLAB 
Since Skylab was a major transition in NASA’s history, a number of differences made it 
unprecedented when compared with the previous programs.  It was the first long-duration flight 
in NASA history.  The previous duration record had been fourteen days, set by Gemini VII in 
December 1965.1  Not only would the first crew double that to twenty-eight days, but the second 
crew would more than double that again to fifty-nine days, and the third would stay up an 
astonishing eighty-four days.  This distinction offered a major challenge for the controllers in 
Houston, for they would have to maintain complete vigilance for that period of time rather than 
the little more than a week per mission they had endured with Apollo.  In fact, most of the 
differences centered around this idea of a first long-duration mission. 
Ronald Berry, the Assistant Chief of Mission Design, highlighted three major areas on 
which his group had to focus.  First, they had to create a better model of the Earth and its gravity 
for the long duration orbits.  This led them to study trajectory predictions.  Together, those two 
areas aided them in their consumables predictions.2  One can see how those three important 
differences fed off of each other.  Consumables were especially important because almost all 
would be launched with the workshop since the larger Saturn V rocket had more power to boost 
more weight.     
Since Skylab was orbiting the Earth, tracking would pose another difficulty.  While 
Goddard Space Flight Center [GSFC] in Greenbelt, Maryland, managed the tracking,3 various 
site locations ranging from Fairbanks, Alaska, to Orroral Valley, Australia, to Corpus Christi, 
Texas, and many sites in between supported the tracking.4  Despite this extensive coverage, 
NASA could not track Skylab for a significant amount of the time.  As a result, a recorder saved, 
on a second loop, their conversations and data that occurred when Skylab was not being tracked, 
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and this was “dumped” down to a ground station when the station passed overhead.  Even so, 
Marlowe Cassetti, Skylab’s Mission Planning Manager, for one, was pleased with the much 
improved tracking of Skylab when compared to the Mercury and Gemini days.5  While it is true 
that there were more stations, from a handful to around twenty-one,6 the tracking still needed 
improvement and refinement to attain the status for the current International Space Station. 
As already noted, NASA had to update Mission Control [the Mission Operations Control 
Room or MOCR] in Houston to support the long-duration missions of Skylab.  For the first 
manned mission, MOCR stations had four teams controlling twenty-four hours a day working 
forty-hour weeks.  For the last two manned missions, however, they changed to five teams 
working five days with two days off.7  For many of the controllers, this was a difficult transition.  
To a flight controller like James Mager, the main problem was that Skylab tended to break the 
family routine, which was extremely troublesome.  Instead of working between seven and ten 
days two or three times a year, as in Apollo, they worked basically continuously for nine 
months.8  This difference was, understandably, very difficult. 
Some NASA employees took the transition from Apollo to Skylab especially negatively.  
Melvin Brooks, a systems flight controller, conveyed an interesting view into the psyche of some 
controllers.  He stated that everything in his life led up to Apollo, and that “Skylab was a bit of a 
setback after that.”9  He went on to say that “a lot of people were disenfranchised with Skylab.  
Skylab was kind of boring.”  He felt much the same way about the ISS and concluded that the 
next logical step would have been to move directly on to Mars.10  Similarly, Donald Gregory, an 
Executive Officer in the Flight Crew Operations Directorate, called Skylab “anti-climatical.”11  
Jerry Bostick, a respected flight controller, felt much the same way.  He, much like many other 
controllers, wanted to keep going with Apollo missions.  Since there was little thought of Skylab 
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as a challenge, especially when compared to Apollo, it was seen as boring.12  He explained, “we 
didn’t feel like other than proving how long that men could live in space and doing some 
scientific experiments which most of us non-scientists really didn’t understand (or care that) very 
much about, (unfortunately), I’d have to admit, you know, but it was just pretty boring stuff.”13  
Bostick went so far as to argue, unsuccessfully, that trajectory people should not have to stay in 
the MOCR all the time.  According to him, “they [the flight directors] wanted warm fuzzies.  The 
flight director wanted to see people right there.”14  That is why Bostick lost the debate.  These 
are just a few examples of people who had opposition with the move to Skylab. 
Not all those who worked on the station felt the same way.  In fact, Pete Conrad said a 
number of times that Skylab was better than going to the Moon.15  Eugene Kranz said that 
Skylab was as exciting as Apollo ever was, this coming from the lead flight director of Apollo XI 
and Apollo XIII.16 
The space hardware was another area where the duration of the mission played an 
important role.  While much of the hardware was the same as had been used before, a few 
changes were necessary.  For instance, certain rubber seals on the CSM were fine for shorter 
Apollo missions, but would deteriorate during the longer Skylab missions.  These were 
corrected.17  NASA also had to change testing for materials on the CSM for a longer exposure.18  
Apparently NASA was so concerned about the powering down and powering back up of the 
CSM after months, since it had never been done before, that this was another major reason to 
prepare a rescue mission.  The rescue vehicle would be ready to fly if the CSM in space would 
not cooperate.19  These issues aside, Raymond Melton, of the Flight Systems Test Branch at 
White Sands, New Mexico, maintained that “it turns out that most of the designs for the systems 
on Apollo had been so overdesigned and so conservative and so well done, that even though they 
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were originally made to operate only for a couple of days, they worked quite well when pushed 
way beyond those limits.”20  He then went on to use the reaction control engines as an example.  
Thirty-two were spaced along the CSM and used to position the spacecraft.  Originally designed 
only for the ten days of an Apollo mission, they instead were stretched to work the much longer 
Skylab missions.21  For the most part, the reused Apollo hardware worked well, with some minor 
changes, despite the significant change in the scope of the missions. 
Most of the high-profile flight directors from the Apollo days did not maintain their 
positions for Skylab.  Many, like Gene Krantz and Chris Kraft, received promotions.  According 
to M.P. Frank, one of the biggest problems in MOCR during Skylab was discipline and keeping 
focus.  Apparently, some of the newer flight directors, namely Don Puddy and Neal Hutchinson, 
required separation.  At the same time, while there was an abundance of work to do in MOCR 
during Skylab compared to the Apollo program, the mission presented spans of boredom for the 
flight controllers.  Sometimes this routine left them not completely focused on their jobs.22  
Because of the way communications ran, during the times that the controllers and the orbiting 
station were not connected little could be accomplished and those controllers could grow tired 
and complacent.  This certainly proposed a different situation compared to the Apollo missions. 
Hutchinson, meanwhile, attributed some of the harsh transition problems to the tight 
schedules carried over by MOCR to Skylab.23  During the Apollo missions, the men lived by a 
tight, set schedule because there was a limited amount of time on the missions.  On Skylab, 
however, this regime of scheduling remained which left little room for error.  These missions 
were different because the crew needed more time allotted for certain activities like inventory.  
This took significantly longer than originally expected.  These tight schedules would definitely 
hurt the image of the third and final crew. 
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NASA also had to change its approach to such essentials as hygiene, waste management, 
and eating, among others.  A major psychological difference came from the change in a lengthy 
rather than a short trip.  Lousma likened Skylab to a remote outpost compared to Apollo’s 
camping trip, in that the Skylab astronauts were alone for weeks on end, whereas Apollo 
astronauts were alone only for about ten days.24  The astronauts had to prepare for an extended 
stay together without a great deal of interaction with other people and the outside world.  
Certainly there is a major difference in the approach to the two drastically distinct programs, and 
NASA had to review all perspectives and aspects. 
One problem for Skylab that did not necessarily stem from the length of the mission was 
the budget.  For the most part, the government granted the Apollo program whatever amount of 
money NASA needed to reach the goal of the Moon.  Since 1970, NASA’s budget was cut in a 
reflection of the country’s perception of the space program.  Whereas the Apollo program had 
plenty of money, with Skylab came a program with “a more disciplined budgetary tracking 
period.”25  This new budgetary phenomenon made those working on the program think in more 
disciplined terms.  For instance, Marlowe Cassetti’s division chief, John Mayer, gave him no 
more than one hundred people to accomplish his tasks in Skylab, although this may also be 
attributed to Meyer’s general disinterest with Skylab.  This was a great reduction in manpower 
from the Apollo days, when Cassetti could hire as many people as needed to accomplish the 
task.26  As another example, it was deemed necessary to include a fire hose in the case of a fire.  
The initial proposal for a fire hose was deemed too expensive by Kenneth Kleinknecht, the head 
of the program.  People laughed when someone suggested a garden hose.  After some thought, 
engineers purchased a $20, 75-foot [23-meter] garden hose from Sears and Roebuck.  They 
outfitted it and put it through pressure tests.  After it passed, the mission planners settled on the 
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$20 hose rather than the $160,000 version proposed by the engineers in Huntsville.27  An 
innovative solution saved hundreds of thousands of dollars which, while small in the scope of the 
budget, could add up over time. 
Inter-center rivalry was another issue that did not necessarily stem from the duration of 
the program.  Whatever conflicts may have surfaced in earlier programs were exacerbated by the 
nature of the mission and the dispute between the Marshall Space Flight Center and the Manned 
Spacecraft Center [renamed Johnson Space Center, or JSC, in 1973] over control of the program.  
While some who worked on the program maintained relationships were peaceful between the 
centers, enough individuals have mentioned it that it merits discussion.  For instance, William 
Easter, the GSFC liaison to JSC, spoke of the “turf wars” between Huntsville, Houston, and 
Cape Canaveral, as a “battle royale to see who would do what.”28  Ed Fendell, in charge of 
communications, referred to the conflict between Marshall and Johnson as “sandboxing.”29  Each 
center tried to grab as much territory as they could and call it “theirs.”  Marlowe Cassetti tried to 
explain this by talking about the differences in the structure of the centers.  He claimed Marshall 
was more compartmentalized and its labs did not work together.  Each lab even had independent 
research budgets.  At Johnson, however, the labs worked together more closely.30  These turf 
wars probably did occur, to some extent, but perhaps they can be understood as people fighting 
to keep their jobs. 
Another disadvantage for Skylab as compared to Apollo came in the form of television 
coverage.  Television executives during the Apollo missions asked NASA to schedule the 
missions for better viewing times.  When planning the Skylab missions, trajectory controllers 
tried to have a landing at six o’clock Eastern time.  Instead, a major television company told 
them not to interrupt prime time television for something as mundane as Skylab’s splashdown.  
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NASA acquiesced to the television channels.31  Implausible as it may seem, Skylab’s priority 
was so low, they had to change the schedule to accommodate the television audience.        
Skylab, Henry Cooper concludes in A House in Space, was “not suspenseful, like the 
expeditions to the Moon, but a steady, continuous experience, like life anywhere.”32  To change 
that analogy a little, if Skylab were a year in school, an Apollo mission was a final exam.  Or 
again, if Skylab were a baseball season, an Apollo mission was the playoffs.  Baseball seasons 
are often described as a marathon rather than a sprint, another appropriate analogy.  As Robert 
Heselmeyer, a flight controller, said, “the biggest difference was getting ready for a marathon 
instead of a sprint.”33  All of these are to say that Skylab became an everyday routine, where one 
day was spent much like the next, whereas on earlier missions, each day was different for one 
reason or another.  Each program had different specific goals, and NASA planned the missions 
appropriately to reach those goals.  Skylab was NASA’s unique marathon. 
 33
TRAINING 
By the end of 1966, a number of the astronauts who would later fly on Skylab were 
already part of the AAP office.  The Administration named Alan Bean Chief of the AAP Branch 
in the Astronaut Office in August, and Owen Garriott Chief of the Experiments Branch in 
October.1  Also working in the office were Kerwin and Gibson, among others.2  By May 1967, 
NASA handed technical assignments out.   
TABLE 2: Skylab Crew Branch Assignments 
Crew Member Assignment 
Alan Bean Chief of AAP branch 
Owen Garriott Communications 
Edward Gibson Crew quarters layout and controls 
Joseph Kerwin Food, waste, and IVA 
Jack Lousma Activation and deactivation 
William Pogue Lighting and photography 
Paul Weitz Experiments, AAP 3 and 4 
 
Other astronauts led other important branches including Joe Engle for IVA [Intravehicular 
Activity] equipment, Bruce McCandless for Experiments on AAP 1 and 2, and F. Curtis Michel 
for hand holds, tethers, and foot rails.3 
Once the Apollo program began to slow down, the AAP office began to change 
dramatically.  Before the end of Apollo, most of the astronauts not associated with those 
missions tried to train wherever they could, whenever they could.  For instance, in 1969, Gibson, 
Kerwin and Weitz were able to simulate an EVA in the water tank at Marshall.  They simulated 
an ATM film canister replacement EVA,4 something that would greatly help later Skylab 
missions.  After his successful Apollo XII mission, Pete Conrad became the Chief of the (newly 
named) Skylab Astronaut Office in August of 1970.5  This addition seemed to bring a little more 
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credibility to the program with a clearly appointed leader.  Certainly a program struggling for 
respectability and funding could use a man like Conrad who was very well respected in NASA. 
It was not until January 16, 1972 that NASA announced the official crew assignments 
(listed in Table 3). 
 
TABLE 3: Crew Assignments 
 
Flight Prime Back-up 
SL-2 Conrad, Kerwin, Weitz Schweickart, Musgrave, McCandless 
SL-3 Bean, Garriott, Lousma Brand, Lenoir, Lind 
SL-4 Carr, Gibson, Pogue Brand, Lenoir, Lind 
 
Vance Brand and Don Lind would also train for rescue operations.  Likewise, the back-ups 
would serve as CapCom for each flight.6  Even though Deke Slayton did not make the official 
crew assignments until this late date, the astronauts would end up training together for 
approximately five years.  Now that they received official assignments, they could train more 
thoroughly as a complete crew. 
The location for training the Skylab crews became an issue.  Since Marshall Space Flight 
Center was the home of Skylab, much of the initial training occurred at MSFC.  Dean Grimm, 
Chief of the Flight Crew Integration Division, and Deke Slayton eventually won their argument 
and centralized the training at the Johnson Space Center in Houston.  This change meant that 
NASA had to ship the trainer from Huntsville to Houston, and build a special dock at JSC just 
for that purpose.  They then had to knock down part of Building 7 in order to place the simulator 
indoors.9  NASA moved training to Houston presumably to make life easier on the astronauts 
and controllers, since that was their home, but rivalry among the centers also played a part.   
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For the first few years of training, the biggest problem was that the Apollo missions, still 
in progress, had precedence.  The Skylab crews, including the backup crews, would have to fight 
for time on the trainers when they could.  Because of this, they had to train in a compressed time 
frame, a situation that was very different from the Apollo missions.  This was potentially 
problematic.9  In all, the astronauts received around 2,150 hours of training before launch, 
including everything from equipment to exercise to briefings.  While specialized training began 
in January 1972, it was not until November that NASA linked up the simulators and trainers with 
MOCR for complete training.  Most of the training at JSC occurred in the high-fidelity mockup 
of Skylab that was hooked up to the MOCR.  They could simulate just about everything from 
experiments to habitability to docking, all in real time using an IBM 360/65 computer.  The only 
real complaint from the astronauts coming back from Skylab was the comment that the solar 
observation simulation did not look like what they really saw in space.9   
While each member of the crew had specialties, each member received training in every 
aspect of the mission in the event of an accident or illness.  For example, each learned how to 
perform minor surgeries.9  Training for various activities occurred in many places other than 
Houston, including medical training at Shepherd Air Force Base in Wichita Falls, Texas.13  The 
second and third crews took a fifteen-hour course on Earth observations using the EREP and 
hand-held cameras, set up by George Maul of NOAA [National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration] and Robert Stevenson, the Scientific Liaison Officer of the Office of Naval 
Research at NASA.14  This cross training could prove essential for a successful, long-duration 
flight.  The extensive training could also prove helpful for crew morale and simply getting to 
know each other.  The longer they could work and train together, the better they would feel about 
working together. 
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Another indispensable phase of the training did not even include the Skylab astronauts.  
NASA authorized the Skylab Medical Experiment Altitude Test [SMEAT] in December 1970 as 
a ground-based, 56-day simulation of Skylab.15  The crew members, who included Bob Crippen 
as Commander, Bill Thornton, MD, as Science Pilot, and Karol Bobko as Pilot, experienced full 
training comparable to the real Skylab astronauts, only in condensed form.11  The simulation 
itself ran from July 26, 1972, to September 20, 1972.  They simulated the confinement, the 
equipment, the food systems, and the reduced atmosphere, just about everything save for the lack 
of gravity.12  The astronauts completed tasks just as performed in space, including all medical 
experiments.   
NASA drew some important lessons from this simulation.  For instance, they found that 
the Urine Volume Measuring System was too small and leaked, something they obviously 
needed to fix before launch.  They also learned how to work together in a closed area for a long 
time.  They had to remain focused on the assignment to accomplish their tasks and overrule their 
disagreements.12  SMEAT also saved the astronauts in Skylab from having too fixed a diet.  
Originally, for the medical experiments, the astronauts would all eat the same amount of calories 
each day.  While theoretically this may be practical, in reality, every person has his own daily 
need.  Some of the more robust astronauts needed more calories while some smaller astronauts 
needed less.  Thankfully for them, the doctors realized the truth behind the matter, and they 
tailored each diet to the individual astronaut.13  This extremely important lesson proved 
invaluable to those who worked on the station.  This type of simulation was vital to NASA for it 
gave an idea of what the astronauts might experience over an extended period of time in space.  
Certainly nothing NASA had done up to that point could compare to these simulators.  These 
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lessons, weighty or not, helped Skylab run smoother.  By the end of SMEAT, most of NASA 
was ready for the launch of its first space station. 
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SKYLAB LAYOUT AND EXPERIMENTS 
The launch of the unmanned Skylab space station marked the end of an era.  On May 14, 
1973, NASA launched the last Saturn V, the workhorse of the Apollo program, and the largest 
rocket ever produced.  A typical Saturn V was 364 feet (110.9 meters) tall and weighed 6.7 
million pounds (3.04 million kilograms).  The first stage could generate 7.5 million pounds (3.4 
million kilograms) of thrust.1  The Saturn V had used all of this thrust to reach the Moon.  A 
launch of a Saturn V proved a powerful example of man’s scientific ability. 
For Skylab, NASA modified the Saturn V.  Since Skylab did not need as much power as 
needed to reach the Moon, NASA engineers converted the third stage into the Skylab workshop 
instead of the typical fuel storage tank as originally designed.  The Lunar Module [LM] was also 
jettisoned.  The Saturn V for Skylab instead stood only 333.7 feet (101.7 meters) tall and 
weighed 6.2 million pounds (2.8 million kilograms).2   
The Saturn 1B rocket was like a miniature version of the large Saturn V.  The Saturn 1B 
was a two-stage vehicle, rather than three-stage.  It also was only 223 feet (68 meters) tall, so for 
the three Skylab launches, a 127 foot (38.7 meters) tall “milk stool” brought the vehicle up to the 
appropriate height for the tower built for Saturn V rockets.3  A Saturn 1B, when fully ready for 
launch, weighed around 650 tons.4  While slightly less impressive compared to its behemoth 
cousin, the three Saturn 1B launches sending a total of nine men to Skylab must have been 
amazing enough. 
The dry workshop was a station converted from a third stage of the Saturn V rocket.  For 
the first time, NASA engineers and scientists discussed the living conditions and habitation of a 
space vehicle.5  Before Skylab, habitation had not been a concern since the missions lasted a 
relatively short period of time and living arrangements contained only the necessities.  For a 
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longer mission, however, the astronauts would have to live and work in this area for an extended 
period of time, so a certain amount of comfort seemed necessary.  One addition that the 
astronauts continuously had to fight for was the window.  By definition, a glass window 
immediately threatens the structural integrity of a space vehicle, especially one traveling at such 
speeds and bearing such overwhelming forces to leave the atmosphere.  Engineers thought a 
window was too risky, but the astronaut office was adamant.  In the end, NASA decided to add 
the window on October 31, 1969.6  This struggle proved that NASA would listen to the 
astronauts’ wishes to make the station more comfortable and habitable.  Throughout the Skylab 
program, NASA reaffirmed numerous times the merit of the window, both for entertainment and 
for research. 
Skylab used the same Command/Service Module [CSM] as the Apollo missions, and this 
docked to the Orbital Workshop [OWS] of Skylab at the Multiple Docking Adapter [MDA].  The 
MDA measured seventeen feet (5.1 meters) long, ten feet (three meters) in diameter, and 
weighed 13,800 pounds (6,210 kilograms).  This area housed control panels for solar 
observations and Earth observations, as well as spare parts and stowage.  The Airlock Module 
[AM] was located between the MDA and the OWS. It measured approximately seventeen feet 
(5.1 meters) long, a maximum diameter of twenty-two feet (6.6 meters), and a mass of 49,000 
pounds (22,050 kilograms).  The AM contained the EVA hatch, which was actually a spare from 
the Gemini missions, and the Instrument Unit for the activation of the Skylab workshop.   
A modified third stage of the Saturn V rocket, the Orbital Workshop [OWS], was the 
main area of Skylab.  The OWS was forty-eight feet (14.4 meters) long, twenty-two feet (6.6 
meters) wide, and weighed approximately 78,000 pounds (35,100 kilograms).  The OWS 
included the majority of the living area, including the sleeping and eating areas, most of the 
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experiments, and the trash airlock.  The Skylab with CSM attached measured 117 feet (35.7 
meters) long, weighed 199,750 pounds (90,604.6 kilograms), and had a habitable volume of 
12,700 feet cubed (372.2 meters cubed).   
Designers located the Apollo Telescope Mount on the outside of the MDA using it for 
solar observations.  The ATM included four solar arrays that would provide about half of the 
electrical power to the station, with the other supplied by the larger solar arrays located on the 
OWS itself.7  Also located in the MDA, the Earth Resource Experiment Package photographed 
the Earth for various experiments.  The training module housed at Space Center Houston [SCH], 
in Houston, Texas, and the second Skylab station at the Smithsonian Institution National Air and 
Space Museum in Washington, D.C., provide a better understanding for the size of the station.  
Pictures and words on a page hardly can do justice to this remarkable engineering achievement. 
Due to the longer duration of Skylab, some engineers at NASA believed that some kind 
of protection was needed against micrometeoroids.  Burton Cour-Palais, a specialist in meteoroid 
sciences and hypervelocity impact physics, proposed an idea for an “outer skin” to stand five 
inches off the surface of the workshop.  During launch, however, it was placed flush against the 
side of the vehicle in an attempt to keep air pressure from building up and ripping it off.8  
Thermal engineers saw the design for this shield and felt like it could have another role.  They 
saw this as a perfect outer layer to work in conjunction with the protective layer of the skin of the 
workshop to block heat from the sun.  Without this shield, however, an extra layer of protection 
that the thermal engineers deemed necessary would leave the workshop extremely vulnerable to 
the sun.  John Aaron, an EECOM during Skylab, speculated that had the shield been called the 
thermal shield rather than the meteoroid shield, and therefore had a subconsciously more 
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important role, more attention would have been paid to its development and placement for 
launch.9  
One of the most influential and important areas of research from Skylab was the solar 
astronomy that came from the ATM.  Time on the ATM was in high demand, but those in charge 
of scheduling had a unique way of dealing with it.  Planners gave interested parties a set amount 
of hours in which to do their observations.  Then they could decide what they wanted to do with 
that time.10   One of the astronomers, Dr. Richard Tousey, was so concerned about the 
experiments that he petitioned to be able to talk directly to the astronauts.  Of course this 
opposed NASA procedures, under which only the CapCom talked to the astronauts.  NASA 
officials, however, compromised and allowed astronomers to talk once a week with the 
astronauts to prepare for the coming week.  In the end, Dr. Tousey never did talk to the 
astronauts, though some of the people he worked with did.11  He simply did not want to be told 
that he could not talk to them.  Struggles like that happened often in an area where large egos 
were involved.  ATM work consisted mostly of solar observations.  With the third crew, 
however, Comet Kohoutek received at least some part of the observations.      
Medical experiments played another important role in Skylab science.  A lower-body 
negative pressure experiment could test, among other things, blood pressure and heart rate.  
Scientists then compared these findings to tests on Earth to determine any differences.  A bicycle 
ergometer measured the astronauts’ metabolic rate.  Various experiments required regularly 
taken blood and urine samples.12  These medical experiments would test the effect of long-
duration space travel and scientists could apply them to future missions.  For the most part, the 
medical experiments confirmed what scientists had previously believed about life in 
microgravity.  Some friction existed between the medical community and the controllers and the 
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astronauts.  Many times the medical people wanted more information, but the controllers were 
unwilling to ask the astronauts for personal information.  Richard Johnston, Director of Life 
Sciences, acted as a mediator of sorts between the medical experimenters and the controllers.  He 
believed that the medical people were marginalized and not shown proper respect by the other 
controllers, though they were just trying to do their job.13  They did work out some of the 
friction, however, by the end of the program.   
The EREP consisted of the final area of major scientific experiments on Skylab.  With 
EREP, for the first time NASA made a significant effort to study the planet.  The EREP 
experiments were so important that the orbit of the workshop was aligned in such a way to make 
the most of those experiments.14  While some of the ATM systems were automatic, the EREP 
was strictly manual.15  Don Lind served as a sort of liaison for the crew interface of the EREP.16  
Charles Harlan became the head of the Earth Resources Aircraft Program.  This program would 
fly any number of planes at the same time as an EREP pass, and they would perform much the 
same functions as the EREP only at different altitudes.  This way they could correlate the 
findings from the aircraft with those of the EREP on Skylab.17  Engineers built a new film vault 
in order to cope with the longer periods of contact with radiation in space.  The vault weighed 
some 2,000 pounds (900 kilograms) to store all the film and to provide protection against 
radiation.  Another interesting aspect is that the orbit allowed for coverage of northern areas that 
the astronauts had not had an opportunity to film during earlier flights.  This meant that more of 
North America and Europe could be studied.18  Sometimes events on the Earth affected EREP 
observations.  During this time, the French were conducting some experiments, presumably with 
nuclear devices, that if viewed by an astronaut through the equipment could lead to blindness.  
The planners, therefore, had to warn the astronauts if there might be some activity or schedule 
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observational passes around such events.19  NASA had to consider many details when hosting 
Earth resources experiments.  
Scheduling of experiments became an important issue every day of Skylab.  The 
controllers themselves did not want to decide the importance of each experiment.  Every night, 
during the night shift, planners met to discuss the coming day’s schedule.  Talks became so 
heated that they needed a mediator.  NASA chose Robert Parker, a scientist-astronaut, to 
moderate among the different disciplines.  Bill Lenoir later worked in this capacity as well.  He 
earned the title, the “Science Czar.”  For the planners, the medical people were easiest to deal 
with since they had priority.  They, for the most part, received whatever time they required.  The 
solar physicists and EREP personnel, however, never seemed to have the time they wanted to 
complete their experiments.20  In the end, the experiments exceeded NASA’s planned output. 
Since controllers would be deciding on daily schedules only days in advance, NASA 
engineers added a teleprinter so the astronauts could receive those plans.  The paper was only 
about two and one-half or three inches wide.21  Controllers had to place all written transmissions 
on this paper.  Since the controllers were so busy with the mission, and perhaps were not 
proficient with typing, Ed Fendell brought in secretaries from all over the center to transfer 
communications to the teleprinter.  He eventually assigned Shirley Hinson to manage that task.22  
In this way, they allowed employees who may not work as closely with a mission to have a 
direct hand in it.   
To help the scientists, NASA built the first Payload Operations Control Centers [POCC] 
in Building 30, the mission control center.  Each of the ATM, medical, and EREP crews could 
have their own room for the first time.23  In addition, NASA built a Flight Operations 
Management Room [FOMR] to replace the previous Spacecraft Performance Analysis room 
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[SPAN].  The FOMR could hold meetings for management decisions, and in the case of Skylab, 
it also helped to integrate the interested members from Marshall Space Flight Center.24  These 
types of rooms are still used today for the shuttle and ISS. 
For the first time in NASA’s history, habitability in the OWS became an important topic 
before the program.  The workshop was large enough that the astronauts each had their own 
individual sleeping compartments, a feature still unique to Skylab.25  This allowed for more 
personal time and at least a perception of being able to remove oneself from the days activities.  
Clothing also changed drastically from earlier flights.  The astronauts now had a choice in their 
clothing.  With zip-off sleeves and pant legs, the astronauts could customize their clothing and be 
more comfortable.  Adaptability became the key to the clothes design.  The brown coloring, 
though, left something to be desired.  That unattractive feature can be blamed on the necessity of 
flame-retardant materials.26  For Conrad, a veteran of the Apollo program, a number of 
habitability issues made Skylab better.  Microwaveable food, real showers, waste management, 
and more comfortable clothes highlight his list of improvements.27 
One should also recognize the food on Skylab as another area of improvement.  A study 
in 1972 concluded that the following food problems would have to be addressed: “extended 
storage times, variations in storage temperatures, no opportunity to resupply or change foods 
after launch. . . first use of frozen foods in space, first use of a food-warming device in 
weightlessness, relatively small size of production lots requiring statistically valid sampling 
plans, and use of the food as an accurately controlled segment of sophisticated life science 
experiments.”28  All food launched with the workshop, so NASA had to fully attend to all these 
problems before that launch.  There were sixty-nine different varieties of food for 420 days plus 
a fifteen percent allowance for variations.  They stored all food in aluminum cans to help 
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preserve it.29  By adding food warmers, the astronauts would have a greater variety and better 
quality of food available for consumption while in space.30  One of the more difficult aspects of 
the food situation arose because it was a major part of the life sciences studies on humans in 
long-duration space travel.  While an original plan called for a control on all food, the 
administrators decided to give the astronauts some freedom in their food choices.  Thus, they 
only controlled six nutrients.  The diet for each astronaut began twenty-one days before launch 
and concluded eighteen days after their return from space.31  The food planners also had to keep 
in mind waste management, and therefore created a comprehensive list of foods to avoid for 
waste management reasons.  These foods included grains, cheese, excessive fats, fried food, 
milk, excessive sugar, and certain fruits and vegetables.32  Scientists had to account for a myriad 
of aspects when preparing foods for long-duration space missions. 
The astronauts and those on the ground constantly monitored the food, like most aspects 
of the program.  Sometimes the people in charge of the food did not hear what they wanted to 
hear from the crews.  For example, in a memo on the food dated July 11, 1973, they complained 
that “the SL-2 crew seems to be groping for information and probing the system for faults.  
Numerous misconceptions are being bantered about including: a. ‘Chili is no good’ this is not 
true – the chili is in excellent condition.”33  Apparently they did not appreciate that the first crew 
was doing their jobs by reporting problems and dislikes.  They also seemed to have missed the 
point that while the chili may have been in good condition, the crew simply did not like its taste.  
The report goes on to remark that the second crew was “counteracting rumors that food is bad – 
especially corn, chili, and bread.”34  Since this came from a biased source, it may be construed 
that the people in charge of food were simply trying to keep their jobs by downplaying any 
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negative feedback and highlighting compliments.  While not perfect, the food was better than on 
previous programs and the staff would upgrade the food  for future programs.   
One final area of improvement for the crew was entertainment.  Due partially to the 
longer duration of the missions and partially to the loosened schedule as compared to Apollo, the 
NASA habitability planners could include some things to help the astronauts stave off boredom.  
The astronauts themselves were given some freedom to purchase items.  Pete Conrad, for one, 
brought some maps to help aid his Earth observations through the large window.35  They were 
also given entertainment kits.  These included, among other things: Velcro darts that did not 
work well because of the lack of gravity, books for reading, a cassette player, and, amazingly, 
fire-proof playing cards, probably the only such deck in the world.36  Each astronaut gave the 
technicians a playlist of sorts so that the staff could make cassettes for use in the workshop.  
Conrad asked for such artists as Jeanne Pruett, Loretta Lynn, Conway Twitty, Charlie McCoy, 
Johnny Cash, Glen Campbell, Patsy Cline, and Dean Martin.37  Kerwin requested mostly 
classical music, such as Baroque music, Brahms, and Ravel, and showtunes, like H.M.S. 
Pinafore.38  Weitz, meanwhile, had a more eclectic taste with the Sons of the Pioneers, Johnny 
Cash, the Mormon Tabernacle Choir, Beethoven, Henry Mancini, Andy Williams, Wayne 
Newton, and Pat Boone among his recordings.39  These lists show once again how the astronauts 
came to the mission from vastly different backgrounds, but were able to come together on a 
common pursuit.  This is not to say that the astronauts were only up there to have fun.  They 
were, however, allowed an hour or so each day to relax and to help ease the stress of the 
missions.   
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SKYLAB I 
At 1:30 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on May 14, 1973, the Skylab workshop lifted off 
into the heavens to orbit the Earth.  Just seconds after takeoff, Mission Control in Houston, 
Texas, began tracking the station for the first of hundreds of afternoons.  This afternoon was 
unusual, however, but not just because it was the first and last launch of its kind.  Only about a 
minute into the flight, Skylab was already in danger.  At that moment, controllers knew that the 
shield to protect the Skylab from micrometeoroids and thermal damage deployed well before it 
should have.1  Events began to unravel quickly that would change the course of the mission. 
Just sixty-three seconds into the flight, the force of the launch into space had prematurely 
deployed and ripped off the micrometeoroid shield.  Then, approximately ten minutes into the 
flight, part of the solar arrays broke off and were unable to deploy correctly.2  This caused many 
problems for NASA.  The solar panels would not generate the required amount of energy.  Until 
they fixed this problem, any crew living on board would have to operate at less than full power.  
The bigger problem was whether or not a crew was capable of living on board at all.  NASA had 
also designed the shield to block the intense heat of the sun. Without this, the station quickly 
heated up.  With no shield, the heat would make it almost impossible to inhabit.  Also there was 
little to no protection against small fragments, micrometeoroids, that might impact the station. 
NASA notified the astronaut crews about the circumstance as quickly as possible, each of 
them in different ways since most had already left the launch site.  Whatever the concern of the 
others, Weitz maintains that he was confident that at least the first crew would fly, if only just to 
take pictures of the wounded station.3  While some may have expressed concern that the mission 
was a lost cause and they would lose their chance to fly, Lousma had a rather optimistic 
approach.  He said that after he heard about the problem, his reaction was that it could be worse, 
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and that they just had to find a way to fix it.4  What followed would be, perhaps, the most 
intensive inter-center cooperation to fix a problem in the history of NASA. 
Engineers and scientists from all over the space agency worked together to help solve the 
problem.  Kerwin and Schweickart, among others, headed directly to the large pool at Marshall 
to work on the various options proposed.  They resolved to test each option in the near-
weightless environment of the pool.  Meanwhile, they also had to find out how to fix the solar 
array problem.  Fortunately, on May 22, Weitz demonstrated that he could free the array by 
releasing the debris in a method comparable to using a large pair of garden shears.5   
Two solutions to the lost shield problem quickly became the most favorable.  The 
engineers in Huntsville came up with an awning concept.  The astronauts, flying in the command 
and service module just outside the workshop, could deploy an awning over the workshop to act 
as a shield.6  The engineers in Houston felt this was too complicated, since nothing like it had 
been done before, so they decided to try something else.  Jack Kinzler, the Chief of Technical 
Services, thought of a more simple solution: a parasol.  Using an empty camera box on the side 
of the Skylab, the astronauts could set up a telescoping fabric shield that could deploy over the 
surface of the workshop and function in a way similar to the missing shield.  Kinzler would win 
the highest NASA award, the Distinguished Service Medal, for his parasol concept.7  Due mostly 
to its simplicity, the final agreement was to develop the parasol and send it up with the first crew.  
The material used for the parasol, however, would not last for the duration of the mission since it 
could last in ultraviolet radiation for only a short duration.  As a result, Marshall’s awning would 
eventually replace the parasol.8 
Developing the parasol in about ten days required an immense amount of cooperation 
between JSC and MSFC, as well as many long hours by the engineers involved.  For instance, 
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Fred Rowell was the lead man in the shop who worked on the metal and welding for the parasol.9  
One of the first and most important steps in this act was to test materials and to come to a 
solution as to what materials to use.  Aleck Bond, the Assistant Director of Chemical and 
Mechanical Systems, helped to coordinate this process.10  James McClane, who worked in 
vacuum chambers of Building 33 as part of the Space Environment Test Division, was one of the 
individuals who helped to test the degradation of the materials used on the parasol.11  James 
McBarren, who worked mostly on the space suits, helped to set up an area at Marshall to sew 
together the parasol and awning.  In fact, he had to call up a manufacturer on a Friday night for 
500 yards of aluminized Mylar.  The next morning, by special delivery, the Mylar was in place.12  
Kenneth Young, head of Orbital Design, worked overtime to work out a rendezvous problem.  
NASA officials decided that the first crews’ rendezvous with the workshop would need to occur 
in daylight somewhere over Hawaii or the continental United States so that the ground crew 
could have live video.  Young and others worked almost double their normal hours in order to 
make sure they had all the specifications correct.13  These are just a few examples of the myriad 
of “unsung engineers” who came together in this short period of time to find a solution to a 
major problem.14   
While all this work was going on, the flight controllers still had to control the workshop 
as it orbited.  NASA assigned half of the mission controllers to work the fix, while the other half 
stayed on their consoles in mission control.  So, instead of four teams for each console, only two 
were left, the teams of Chuck Lewis and Milton Windler.15  For ten days, mission controllers 
worked at least twelve-hour shifts, usually 7:00 to 7:00, much like those working on the 
parasol.16  With the loss of the meteoroid shield, the workshop lost a major form of thermal 
protection.  The controllers had to set up a different attitude, the position of the station in 
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relationship to its axes and the sun, for Skylab to keep the sun off the exposed area of the 
workshop.  Unfortunately, the attitude to keep the sun off the workshop prevented the ATM solar 
arrays from absorbing energy.  Thus, they had to compromise between overheating the workshop 
and having enough energy to keep Skylab flying.17  They had to pitch up the OWS to keep it 
from overheating.  One more problem with this scenario occurred because the only way to know 
the true orientation of the workshop was through a sun sensor.  It had a narrow area in which the 
sun was supposed to remain so the controllers could know the exact orientation.  By changing 
the attitude, the sun could not stay in the sensor and therefore they would not know the 
orientation.  They realized that temperature sensors on the ATM could help because with the 
drastic difference between sun and shade they could tell which sensors were in sun or shade.18  
Interestingly enough, when the controllers reoriented the workshop for the arrival of the first 
crew, the sun ended up being exactly where the controllers had predicted, despite ten days of 
constant shifting using these methods.19 
Due to the cold of space, the original plan called for the EECOMs to turn on heaters.  
John Aaron quickly recognized this not to be the correct course of action because of the heating 
already occurring.  A brief argument ensued between controllers in Houston who had this 
heating data in front of them and the engineers in Huntsville who were not aware of the situation.  
Aaron simply did not turn the heaters on so as not to exacerbate the problem.20  Quick thinking 
prevailed to stop the heat from becoming an even bigger worry. 
During this time, another anomaly occurred when some of the charger battery relay 
modules, or CBRMs, began to stop working.  These were important because the solar arrays 
charged the batteries so they could work in the shade.  Without these on, the workshop could 
lose all power and not have power to be reactivated.  On the next pass, the workshop would not 
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pass over any tracking sites until it was over the United States, so some of the flight controllers 
had to call the stations in Guam and Hawaii and have them change their alignment and boost 
their power.  Using these, they sent commands that reactivated the CBRMs and once again saved 
the workshop.21  This is yet another example of controllers working behind the scenes to save the 
mission. 
Many NASA employees would agree with Kenneth Young, who called the time spent 
fixing the workshop “the hardest [they] ever worked.”22  Others might agree with Melvin 
Brooks, who called it the “exciting part” of Skylab.23  And, of course, some may agree with both, 
that it was the hardest work and also the most exciting work on Skylab.  Some have also made 
the comparison of the launch and fix of the Skylab workshop to the problem and fix of Apollo 
XIII.  Regardless of their viewpoint, most NASA employees probably would agree that this was 
a turning point in showing how they could handle an on-orbit accident and come up with a 
workable solution in a relatively small amount of time. 
Once they were confident with the efforts of the men working on the parasol, NASA 
officials gave clearance for the first crew, SL-2, to go.  Conrad, for one, was adamant on fixing 
Skylab and completing the mission.  Since he had worked on the workshop in some way since 
1968, he looked at it as his baby, much like an old motorcycle he owned as a child.24  A final 
schedule revision placed the launch of Conrad, Kerwin, and Weitz for May 25, 1973. 
 52
SKYLAB II 
Skylab II, SL-2, launched on May 25, 1973 at 9:00 a.m.1  The three astronauts visually 
checked the workshop upon rendezvous. With great conviction, they reported that they could, 
indeed, fix the problem.   
For their first EVA, Weitz hung out of the door of the CSM while Kerwin held his feet 
and Conrad flew the vehicle.  Weitz attempted to hook the metal strap that was holding down the 
solar array.  Conrad would then try to back away from the workshop with the CSM.  
Unfortunately, this attempt to free the solar array was unsuccessful.  In fact, the controllers 
realized just how dangerous that could be.2  So the crew had to quit for the day and, instead, dock 
to the station.3  This docking, to add to their troubles, was anything but routine.  For some 
reason, the capture locks for docking did not work.  So, Weitz took control of the CSM while 
Conrad and Kerwin worked on the wiring.  After roughly an hour of rewiring in the docking 
tunnel, they finally docked.4  By the time the mission control launch team had worked through 
the first EVA and the docking, they had been on console for roughly twenty-two hours.5  
Apparently the long working days had not ended for the controllers. 
The next day, the crew entered Skylab.  Without the pivotal shield, the temperature was a 
rather warm 130oF (54.4oC).  They therefore engaged in their next job, the deployment of a 
temporary parasol that would act in the shield’s stead.  Though they could not work non-stop due 
to the heat, by the end of the day, they had successfully deployed the parasol about two-thirds 
open. Overnight the temperature dropped to a more agreeable 90oF (32.2oC).6  Although not yet 
at the optimal temperature, it was enough to let the astronauts continue to work the next day.  
The workshop would eventually cool down to the desired temperature. 
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The crew spent much of their first week or so dealing with storage and inventory, while 
also growing accustomed to the layout of Skylab and a typical workday with the many 
experiments.  On June 7, the astronauts were finally allowed to attempt another EVA to fix the 
solar array.  Conrad and Kerwin would leave the station, with Kerwin doing the actual cutting.  
After three hours and twenty-five minutes of hard work and gritty determination, they freed and 
deployed the array.7  With this accomplished, the crew was able to return to normal, full-scale 
work.  They were determined to work much harder in the final two weeks to make up for the 
time spent in the first two weeks both fixing the station and generally not working at a full pace 
due to the initial setbacks.8  Indeed, this first crew constantly spent time fixing or repairing 
problems on the station.  As a result, they could be christened the “Astronaut Repairmen”, as 
they were by National Geographic.9  This label would be true of all three crews, as it seemed as 
though the astronauts always had to fix something.  This same determination and pride in their 
work continued with each crew.  In the end, NASA’s leadership could see that they definitely 
made the right decisions when picking these crews, for no one could accuse the mission 
members of working less than as hard as possible. 
A normal day consisted of many tasks.  Even when the station was not at full strength 
before they fully deployed the solar panel, the astronauts still accomplished as much as possible.  
Each day the astronauts would exercise, complete all their medical requirements, work on the 
ATM with solar studies, and do housekeeping chores.10  Since they had trained together as a 
crew for almost three years, they worked together well.  Perhaps one of the elements that helped 
them get along so well was their common Navy background.  They also knew that they were 
there to do a job; they had to work together to complete the mission successfully.  At one point, 
while trying some gymnastics in the circular area for the storage bins, Conrad dislocated his 
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finger.  Dr. Kerwin reset it, taped it, and they went back to work without telling the controllers in 
Houston.11  This type of do-it-yourself teamwork exemplified almost all astronaut crews, but 
especially those on Skylab. 
The first crew never asked for extra work.  They did this purposefully, for they did not 
want to ask for too much and then have the flight controllers add too much work for the next 
crew.12  They had free time, and like all three crews, they spent the majority of their free time 
looking out the window at the Earth.  Apparently, most of the astronauts felt as though they did 
not know their geography as well as they should, but a chart on board the station defining their 
location proved helpful,13 even if they may not have had enough time to see exactly where they 
were.  The astronauts had other means of passing their free time available, but none appealed to 
any of the crews as much as viewing the Earth through the window. 
Another important development revolved around communications between the astronauts 
and their families.  Before Skylab launched, the issue of whether or not to let the crew have 
private conversations with their family surfaced.  The astronauts wanted private talks, but the 
media fought against it, afraid that the crew would say something important and they, the media, 
would miss an important story.  Since NASA decided against the crew and their families’ 
privacy, the first crew said they would not talk if it could not be private.  For the second and third 
crew, however, NASA relaxed the guidelines, and the astronaut and his family were allowed to 
talk together with one “trusted NASA” employee listening in and reporting anything out of the 
ordinary.  While the media in general did not like this, they had to concede, and they never 
reported anything from the conversations. Fortunately for the astronauts, NASA officials 
changed their minds about the privacy issue, probably as a result of the first mission’s successful 
completion, and allowed the astronauts to have private conversations with their families. 
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About a week before NASA scheduled the crew to come home, Mission Control asked 
the astronauts if they would not mind staying up in space an extra week.  At that time, due to 
budget cuts, NASA was still unsure if the third crew would fly a mission, and they wanted to get 
the most data and results out of the station.  While the SL-2 crew wanted to fly home on time, 
since space could not compare to the comforts of home, Conrad assured Houston that they were 
willing to help out any way that they could.  Fortunately, a day or two later, NASA confirmed 
the third crew mission.14  The SL-2 crew could leave on the twenty-eighth day as planned.  The 
idea that the crew would not want to stay up longer seems unusual to outsiders since many 
people would pay, and some have, to be able to spend time in space.  The other two crews did 
not seem to mind staying up for fifty-six and eighty-four days, respectively.  Perhaps this feeling 
of longing for home was confined to just these three astronauts. 
The last few days before leaving, the crew prepared the station for departure and stowed 
away objects.  They undocked from Skylab on June 22 at 3:58 a.m.  By 8:49 a.m., their 
Command Module was bobbing in the ocean waiting to be picked up.  Conrad, Kerwin, and 
Weitz had set the spaceflight endurance mark at twenty-eight days, forty-nine minutes, and forty-
eight seconds, with a total of four hundred and four orbits.15  They had fully doubled the 
previous record.  They successfully fixed the station so that it would survive the duration of the 
missions.  Phil Shaffer commented that the first crew “saved the program” because “they took 
some risks that were above and beyond the call of duty.”16  Overall, Skylab II was a most 
successful mission. 
The first crew in Skylab had one last interesting adventure after their mission ended.  
Shortly after their return, Dr. Chuck Ross broke the standard quarantine and allowed them to fly 
to California.  There they met President Richard Nixon, who was hosting Russian General 
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Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Chuck Conners, the star of television’s “The Rifleman,” at his 
Western White House.17  By all accounts they had a mutually engaging time, and it was difficult 
to tell who was more excited by meeting whom.  Sometimes the President’s wishes take 
precedence over NASA rules. 
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SKYLAB III 
A little over a month after the first crew had returned, the second crew, Skylab III, had 
finished training and was ready to launch.  The first crew spent a few weeks after their mission 
finishing the medical experiments and debriefing.  NASA passed on the information from those 
meetings to Bean, Garriott, and Lousma, in order to help them have a more efficient mission.  
The food preparation personnel also learned from a mistake mentioned by the first crew, and 
added more Tabasco Sauce to the menu to help with taste.1  In the microgravity of space, taste 
buds act differently than on Earth and food loses much of its taste.  As a result, condiments such 
as hot sauces and salt become more and more important to add some taste to food. 
Skylab III, in their Saturn 1B, lifted off at 7:10 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on July 28, 
1973.  It only took them a little under ten minutes to reach orbit.2  Soon after they were visually 
observing the station.  In fact, they docked nine hours after launch and actually entered the 
station only two hours after docking.3  They were able to dock and enter much quicker than the 
first crew because neither did they have to worry about an EVA before docking, nor did they 
have the docking problems as the first crew encountered.  Unfortunately, the mission soon would 
slow down to almost a crawl. 
Whereas the first crew had been almost completely healthy, illness hampered the second 
crew.  The entire crew became sick almost immediately and fell behind schedule.  Instead of 
trying to continue their routines, and working to assuage the fatigue of the illness, NASA gave 
the astronauts permission to rest for the first three or four days.  This actually gave the flight 
surgeons a chance to study the effects of space sickness.4  After this rest period, the crew felt 
much better.  Perhaps due to this slow start, they became an extremely efficient and hard-
working crew. 
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Just a few days later, on August 2, alarms started showing that something was wrong 
with the command service module.  Alan Bean had reported this just a few hours into the 
mission, but little attention had been paid to his statement.  The CSM had four Control Moment 
Gyros [CMGs], thrusters, used to stabilize it around the service module.  Two of the four began 
leaking, one of those completely out.  They also happened to be on opposite ends of the service 
module, meaning they lost control in one axis.5  Don Arabian, manager of the Program 
Operations Office, and Arnold Aldrich, deputy manager of Skylab, worked with the 
manufacturers at North American Rockwell Corporation to conclude that they probably could 
survive if the remaining two did not leak as well.6  As a precaution, NASA began prepping 
Brand and Lind for a rescue mission, readied by September 5.  In their simulations, however, the 
two showed that even with a crippled CSM, the crew could successfully return without harm.  In 
effect, they talked themselves out of the chance to fly.7  Even though it was not needed, the fact 
that they were ready to go proved that a rescue plan could become  necessary and possible for 
such a mission.  The two worked extremely hard and, in their own way, saved Skylab again.  
Thanks to the hard work of many individuals at NASA, they could avert another potentially 
disastrous problem. 
Garriott and Lousma attempted the first EVA to install the permanent awning on August 
6.8  The original plan was for the EVA to take three and a half hours, but, due to unforeseen 
difficulties, they were out for six hours and twenty-nine minutes, a full three hours longer than 
planned.9  This new shield had immediate effects, lowering the temperature the first night to 
90oF (32oC) and shortly to the desired temperature around 70oF (21oC).  The extended EVA once 
again showed that activities tended to take longer in space than they did in simulation.  The 
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astronauts of Skylab fell behind schedule mostly because of unrealistic goals and expectations 
set by the flight controllers. 
The crew of Skylab III included very different personalities than the first crew.  While 
Lousma and Garriott tended to love acting in front of the camera, Bean, the commander, was 
always trying to do more.10  The commander remained highly motivated and focused.  Lousma 
stood out as a “conventional Marine,” staying loyal and friendly with the will to complete the 
job.11  The first crew maintained that they made sure to eat all their meals together to keep the 
human contact.12  This crew, on the other hand, rarely ate together, especially lunch.  As Lousma 
said, since they were always rushing to work more and accomplish more goals, “things you 
needed to do the most to prolong your life…were the things that got the least priority: eating on 
time, sleeping on time, exercising on time.”13  They were extremely dedicated to their work, so 
they sometimes overlooked the most important concerns.  Perhaps this is owing to a sense of 
being “on the clock” and always trying to get the most out of the limited time in space.   
Even so, the crew found time to have some fun.  One day, when Bob Crippen was 
CapCom, he heard a woman’s voice calling him from Skylab.  The voice identified itself as Mrs. 
Garriott; she had brought some things to the crew.  She also mentioned that the California wild 
fires, taking place at that time, looked amazing.  She then said that she had to go because 
someone was approaching the Command Module, where communications took place.  Crippen 
went along with it, and told the other controllers what had happened.  It was not until the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the flight that Garriott explained that they had recorded it before the flight, 
adding Crippen’s name and the California fires to make it seem more realistic.  He also 
explained that Crippen knew about it.  They had actually made a number of variations on tape 
using different natural events, playing the correct one depending on what was actually 
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happening.14  The amazing thing about it is that most of the flight controllers did not understand 
how that joke had been played until twenty-five years later.  Jokes like this showed that they 
could have a good time while still working almost non-stop. 
By the end of the mission, the crew had accomplished one hundred and fifty percent of 
their goals,15 a remarkable amount considering all the problems with which they started.  The 
crew returned on September 25, fifty-nine days, eleven hours, and nine minutes later.  They set a 
number of records, including single mission endurance.  Alan Bean accrued the most amount of 
time in space, a full 1,671 hours.16  Perhaps even more important, they proved that man could 
last in space for that long a period of time.  They also came back relatively healthy, even more so 
than the first crew.  One can attribute much of their health to the exercise regime.  At this time, 
Skylab would fly unmanned once again, waiting for the third and final crew to arrive to set even 
more records and accomplish even more research. 
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SKYLAB IV 
The final Saturn 1B to Skylab launched on November 16, 1973 at 9:09 Eastern Standard 
Time.1  Many surprises filled the weeks between the second and third crew. Astronomers had 
observed a new comet, Comet Kohoutek, in March that would achieve its perihelion (point 
closest to the sun) on December 28.  NASA felt that this would be an exciting phenomenon, 
adding perhaps a once-in-a-lifetime chance to observe a comet above the atmosphere with 
astronauts and all the equipment on board the Skylab.  As a result, in April NASA pushed back 
the launch of the third crew to November 9, and again delayed it to the 11th, thus giving time for 
the appropriate training.2  Surely, the astronauts wanted as much training as possible, especially 
since they were an all-rookie crew. 
Yet again the Skylab program had to deal with more setbacks.  During a routine 
inspection of their Saturn 1B rocket on November 6, just five days before the scheduled launch, 
NASA employees found cracks on the fins.  The administration quickly set workers to replace 
them.  A week later they finished replacing all eight fins.3  One reason given for the cracks was 
that the same rocket had been prepared months earlier for the possible rescue mission of Skylab 
III.  The long period of time between initial preparation and the scheduled launch date meant 
there was simply too much weight on them for too long a duration.4  In the true tradition of 
Skylab, the final mission had already dealt with obstacles before it even launched.  This would 
not be the end of the problems. 
Shortly before the launch, Gibson jokingly called their Saturn rocket “Old Humpty 
Dumpty” due to the necessary repairs, and some members of the media reported this statement.  
This angered some of the NASA employees, and they made sure that the astronauts knew how 
they felt.  But around twenty minutes before the launch, the ground called the astronauts waiting 
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in the command module and wished them “Good luck and God speed from all the king’s horses 
and all the king’s men.”5  Evidently, the workers forgave them and, indeed, liked the joke.  Such 
levity was reminiscent more of Bean, Garriott, and Lousma than Carr, Gibson, and Pogue. 
The crew spotted Skylab about seven hours into the flight6 and soon docked.  Not long 
after, Pogue began to feel nauseous and vomited.  Carr and Gibson worried that if Mission 
Control found out, they might stop the mission early and the crew surmised that Pogue would 
soon feel better.  As a result, they decided not to say anything to the MOCR and just continue on 
as if nothing happened.  Unfortunately for them, they did not know that a recorder taped their 
conversation and downloaded it to Mission Control.  When the NASA officials found out what 
had happened, they were very upset with Carr’s judgement.  Deke Slayton, the head of the 
astronaut corps, publicly reprimanded him.7  The incident was not as simple as it sounds, 
however.  Unlike the earlier commanders Conrad and Bean, Carr was a rookie.  As such, he had 
neither the reputation nor the respect that the other two commanders already garnered with the 
flight controllers.  The crew, however, rookie or not, certainly made a bad judgment call to 
choose not to tell MOCR about the illness.  The crew definitely felt remorse for their less than 
forthright decision.8  Nonetheless, the incident left a negative mark on the crew, one difficult to 
overcome. 
When the crew finally entered Skylab, they found three dummies stashed around the 
station left by the earlier crew, still more evidence of the sense of humor of the second crew.  
That crew had worked at an amazing pace, completing, as noted before, one hundred and fifty 
percent of the mission goals.  What Mission Control forgot, however, was how slow the mission 
had begun.  As a result, the controllers started the third crew, from early on, with unrealistic 
schedules.  The crew almost immediately fell behind, and Carr began to complain about the 
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overload.9  Carr, Gibson, and Pogue remained on an impossible pace for the first six weeks and 
then finally requested a rest, talking the situation over with the ground.  From then on, the crew 
and flight controllers had an understanding.  The schedule slackened off slightly.10  In retrospect, 
for the first six weeks a great deal of hostility appeared to exist between the men of Mission 
Control and the three in Skylab.  Most of this probably stemmed from the fact that Carr was 
inexperienced and felt overburdened with work.  Perhaps Carr could have dealt with the illness 
situation better if he had more experience.  At the least the flight controllers may have listened to 
him and respected his viewpoint.  
The New York Times ran an article declaring the third crew “lethargic.”  The paper quoted 
officials saying that they were studying the lethargy of the third crew, and whether or not it could 
be fixed.  They complained that they did not want to work on their day off.  The controllers said 
that they had to lessen the workload, which was true, because the crew could not keep up with it.  
The Times in essence reported that they did not work as hard or as well as the first two crews.11  
Only three days later, the paper published a report that officials were “pleased” with the crew.12  
The news media seemed to jump on any opportunity to report hostilities or problems. 
Beginning with the news reports of a lethargic crew, Skylab IV became by far the most 
controversial of the missions.  One major work on the Skylab program, A House in Space by 
Henry S.F. Cooper, Jr., devotes a majority of its time discussing this controversial crew.  While 
Cooper’s history of the program touched on all three missions, it focused on the crew of Carr, 
Gibson, and Pogue, and their seeming insolence.  Cooper’s analysis inflamed many of the 
conflicts surrounding this particular mission. 
From the first pages of A House in Space, Cooper attacked the crew.  He wrote, “Flight 
controllers and others at the Space Center who had never been faced with reluctant astronauts 
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before, openly talked of them as being lethargic and negative.”13  Again, “Gibson…had a square 
jaw that apparently never stopped moving the whole time he was in space” and he “was perhaps 
the contrariest, bitchingest astronaut that ever departed vertically from Cape Kennedy, and his 
two crewmates were in the same category.”14  Of the other two, “Carr and Pogue grew thick, 
revolutionary-looking beards aboard Skylab…which, combined with the blistering language 
from the space station, made them [the flight controllers] uneasy.”15  Finally, “the remarks of all 
three members of the third crew continued to have a barracks-room grumpiness from the 
beginning of the mission to the end.”16  Each of these are just a sample of the openly hostile 
remarks made against the third crew.  Cooper even included an underlying message that the 
“revolutionary” beards made those in MOCR apprehensive because those beards did not conform 
to the “clean-cut” image of NASA and could even be likened to the Soviets in Russia.  At this 
time, the Cold War still dominated the country’s mindset, and to even imagine such an American 
icon resembling a Communist would make anyone “uneasy.”  A suggestion like this was much 
more grave at the time that the book was published than in today’s world.  To make matters 
worse, the author rarely ever backed up his arguments, except to say that this negativity grew 
from their concealment of Pogue’s sickness. 
NASA instructed each of the crews beforehand to tell the truth about Skylab’s 
habitability.  They were supposed to be critical, offering advice to improve the station.  Each 
crewmember could find something to complain about.  When Lousma spoke out against the lids 
on the food, Cooper remarked that he “at times sounded like a member of the third crew.”17  That 
was an unfair, disparaging comment that had no basis in truth.  Lousma was doing his job, telling 
the NASA officials what he thought about the lids.  Not only did the author rebuke him, but also 
the third crew as well. 
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Interestingly, though, Cooper seemed to change his mind about the crew farther along in 
the book.  He stated that the third crew “griped” and “made so many mistakes and fell so far 
behind,” but there was “nothing seriously the matter with the astronauts at all.”  Instead the 
problem “lay with the ground itself” because they “started these astronauts off at too fast a 
pace.”18  Indeed, Cooper blamed flight director Neil Hutchinson for any problems because he 
pushed the crew thinking they were lazy.19  The reader hardly knows what to believe: was the 
crew really that bad, or could one blame tensions and dissension on the flight controllers in 
Houston? 
Years later, Neil Hutchinson admitted the flight controllers made a mistake by pushing 
the third crew too hard.20  Phil Shaffer agreed that the third crew was pushed too hard too early, 
adding that the all-rookie crew was not “adequately supported” pre-flight, making it a more 
awkward mission than the first two.21  In fact, most flight controllers, including flight directors 
Milton Windler and Chuck Lewis, agreed upon reflection that they had mistreated the third crew.  
More than likely, the tension between the crew and the controllers occurred due to unreachable 
goals set by the controllers and perhaps some attitudinal problems from the crew. 
Another issue about this flight was the so called “Space Strike.”  Around the sixth week 
in Skylab, the crew said that they needed a day off to rest.  They also wanted to talk things out 
with the controllers in Houston.  Everything seemed to be worked out, but the astronauts also 
decided that only one of them would talk to the ground at any one time.  During one whole pass 
over the United States, they forgot to turn the radio back on, not realizing until later that they had 
not heard from Houston.  The media heard about this and dubbed it the “Space Strike,” saying 
that the astronauts were non-cooperative.  Cooper also mentioned this in his book.  Astronaut Dr. 
Gibson took offense to this because Cooper, and other media members, never actually spoke to 
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the astronauts about the so-called strike.  Cooper, in fact, based his narrative solely on the 
communications tapes.22  The tapes are valid sources for scholarly works.  They contain the 
exact words of the astronauts and ground crews without any interference.  To use them 
exclusively, however, can lead to trouble because only using one source for a work will always 
make it biased, and the total lack of any correspondence with the people in the events means 
situations could be taken out of context.  Consequently, without actually speaking with those 
who took part in the events, how could Cooper arrive at a clear and accurate picture?   
Other secondary sources, such as more recent publications like Don Shayler’s Skylab: 
America’s Space Station, corroborate that this crew had problems, perhaps more so than the first 
two, but few treatments are as extreme as Cooper’s.  While the crew certainly struggled at the 
beginning of the mission, this can mostly be contributed to the less than admirable start to the 
mission.  After the incident of hiding Pogue’s sickness, many media members seemed to want to 
make the astronauts out to be “bad guys.”  For the most part, they were doing their jobs by 
complaining about conditions on board Skylab.  The amount of complaining, however, probably 
went too far and damaged their reputation.  The imagined “Space Strike” event did not help their 
standing in the eyes of many critics.  NASA, however, stood by the astronauts and allowed them 
to complete their record-breaking mission. 
Despite all the problems, one may suggest that this final crew was the most productive of 
all, accomplishing even more than the crew of Alan Bean.  Simply on percentage of time alone, 
the third crew spent around forty percent of their time on experiments, the second crew almost 
thirty-nine percent, and the first crew almost thirty-eight percent.  That slight percentage 
difference is made even greater when physical training is factored in, since the third crew spent a 
full percentage point more time on physical activity than the second crew, and over three percent 
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more time than the first crew.23  Each successive crew spent more time on experiments 
generating more output.  The third crew easily spent the highest percentage of time on research 
and outperformed the first two crews (full table found in Appendix A). 
On January 11, 1974, NASA told the crew that they would, indeed, stay at Skylab for the 
full eighty-four days.  This meant that, after forty-eight days, every day, every hour, and every 
minute that they stayed in space was another record.  On February 3, Carr and Gibson departed 
for the final EVA of Skylab, this time a five hour, nineteen minute long spacewalk to collect all 
the samples and film from outside the station.  Just before leaving, the crew boosted the station 
into a higher orbit in an effort to help it last into the 1980’s.  They also left a few resources in the 
station in case NASA scheduled another mission, perhaps with the planned Space Shuttle, to 
redock with Skylab.  On February 8th, they finally left Skylab, flew around taking more pictures, 
and landed in the ocean only five hours later.  The mission had lasted a total of eighty-four days, 
one hour, fifteen minutes, and thirty-two seconds.24  Their record lasted four years until 
Cosmonauts Georgi Grechko and Yuri Romanenko on Salyut 6 were in space for over ninety-six 
days.  Behind them, the crew of Skylab IV left a legacy of science and research.  Man had 
learned, time and again, how to work through adversity in space flight.  Each mission had had its 
share of trials, and each presented NASA in a favorable light, despite some controversies. 
 68
RESEARCH 
On a typical day aboard Skylab, the three astronauts awoke at 6:00 a.m.  They then 
dressed and shaved before eating breakfast around an hour later.  After breakfast, one of the crew 
would head to the ATM for solar observations, while the other two dealt with other experiments, 
such as medical or maneuvering units.1  The average crew member spent one to one-and-one-
half hours on the exercise bike each day, but each crew increased their amount throughout the 
program (see data in Appendix A).2  Meanwhile, the crew would conduct solar observations 
through shifts throughout the day, stopping for lunch when they could.  When all the work was 
done, they could attend to a “shopping list” of experiments or repairs needed to successfully 
complete the mission.  All would stop for dinner around 6:00 p.m., after which the crew dealt 
with household chores and reviewed the next day’s schedule that Mission Control sent up on the 
teleprinter.  In the evening they had some time for recreation, and generally each would have a 
private conversation with the flight surgeon to discuss the medical experiments and any health 
issues.3  While a typical day may not seem very exciting, enough activity kept the astronauts 
busy and brought them closer to reaching their goal of a successful mission.  Many times, of 
course, something interrupted the day, such as an EVA or a necessary repair.  NASA employees 
truly tried their hardest to get the most out of the agency’s investment. 
NASA, and humanity as a whole, gained a number of advances from the Skylab 
missions.  Outside of the experiments, the workshop held the first truly computerized data 
storage system, a necessity for most businesses today.4   One of the important corollary 
experiments was the test of a maneuvering unit for space walks.  The crews flew for a total of 
twelve and one-half hours.  NASA deemed the test “very successful” and recommended it for 
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use on the shuttle.5  From this came the Manned Maneuvering Unit [MMU], a significant part of 
subsequent EVAs. 
Eugene Kranz calls Skylab “probably the most productive era of space science in the 
history of the [NASA] program.”6  Each of the three major areas of scientific interest saw 
intriguing and major developments. 
In the medical experiments area, Robert Heselmeyer notes that they produced a good 
database for long duration space flights.7  Carolyn Huntoon, who worked on a life sciences 
experiment, believes it is “the best data in the world on people exposed to weightlessness” and 
that “to this day, there is nothing that comes close.”8  And again, from Carl Shelley, Chief of the 
Space Science and Technology Branch, “the medical database gathered off Skylab is still 
probably the best one.”9  Dr. Charles Berry, Director of Life Sciences, gives some further insight 
by detailing that they did not find an answer to calcium loss, but they did learn a great deal about 
red blood cell loss, among other anomalies.10  Little doubt remains as to just how important the 
medical science of Skylab was to the field. 
R. Bryan Erb, the principal investigator for the Earth Resources Experiment Package, 
says that they “got some excellent data” despite a limited range because “the data quality was 
much better” than other sources.11  That higher quality data allowed for some high definition 
photographs of cities such as New York City and Washington, D.C., that could be used for a 
variety of purposes.12  Robert Stevenson indicates some other interesting examples.  For 
instance, crews on Skylab observed eddies in the Caribbean Sea that had never been measured.  
This allowed the Navy to account for some acoustic problems so that they could address those 
problems.13  He also mentions that the astronauts observed plankton in the Falkland Current 
stretching 1,500 miles.  Previously there had only been one obscure reference to plankton in that 
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current.14  More new findings came from EREP data.  They investigated such things as strip 
mining, ore deposits, and natural disasters.  The findings even helped Venezuela discover oil, 
which would elevate the country’s status and help to offset the big business of Middle Eastern 
oil.  They even witnessed a secret Chinese nuclear test.15  John Llewellyn once said that he 
“probably learned more doing [Skylab] than anything [he] ever [did] at NASA” while working 
on EREP.16  Even the veterans of the Apollo program could increase their learning curve while 
working on this program.   
Skylab brought some exciting developments to solar astronomy as well.  Marlowe 
Cassetti pointed out that since it was above the Earth’s atmosphere, the Apollo Telescope Mount 
could view the sun in spectrums that cannot be viewed within the atmosphere.17  Don Lind 
perhaps exaggerated somewhat when he claims that Skylab rewrote solar physics and 
astronomy.18  Nevertheless, important contributions did result from this work.  Skylab made 
significant scientific strides in each area of research and experimentation.  These contributions 
help to provide some context to the importance of this program. 
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FROM SKYLAB TO THE SHUTTLE 
NASA discussed the possibility of returning to Skylab only for a short time.  They soon 
deemed another visit to reboost it for a better crash landing with the Earth too risky and too 
complicated, since it would require a somewhat intricate EVA.1  There was also talk that after 
the new shuttle was ready to launch, a crew would rendezvous with the station.  For this mission, 
the administration picked Fred Heise and former Skylab astronaut Jack Lousma.2  Ultimately, the 
discussion would become moot since Skylab left orbit years before NASA fully completed the 
Shuttle. 
The men who worked on Skylab have varying ideas about whether or not it should have 
flown longer.  Donald Arabian believes that manned missions flew to Skylab for only one year 
because it was not worth more.3  Kenneth Kleinknecht goes even further by arguing that they 
accomplished all their goals on Skylab.  He even says that the fight to fly again to Skylab was 
“ludicrous.”4  M.P. Frank, on the other hand, believes it was “short-lived.”5  Jones Roach, 
Deputy Chief of the Flight Control Division, says it is a “shame” there was not enough money to 
keep Skylab flying.6  Eugene Kranz calls “the abrupt termination of Skylab, after only three 
manned missions, almost heretical.”7  John Aaron regrets the loss of Skylab because it was 
already in space, it had more volume than the current station, and they should not have had to 
start from nothing when building the station.8  Today, he argues, NASA could be further along in 
space exploration if they had continued to use Skylab, and the agency could have saved a lot of 
money by using it.9   
NASA built a second Skylab, also known as Skylab II or Skylab B.  Plans developed to 
launch it, until the NASA administration cancelled the program in August 1973,10 presumably 
due to budget constraints and a wish to move on to the shuttle.  Garriott thought this was a 
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mistake.  He mentioned that the second Skylab could have allowed even a longer duration flight.  
Since this did not come about, the second best place for Skylab II would become its resting-
place, the Smithsonian Institution National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C.11  Don 
Lind, the backup and rescue astronaut for Skylab, even petitioned an NASA Administrator to fly 
the second Skylab.  He reasoned that, with all the money already spent on it, they should at least 
get something back in the form of more scientific experiments.  The Administrator simply stated 
that it would set the shuttle back a year.12  Incidentally, the first shuttle launch would not be for 
another eight years.  Since the second workshop did not launch, one can only guess what another 
manned crew could have accomplished.  It is amazing to think that all the hardware was 
constructed at great cost, yet it was never used.  Such are the realities of working in government 
bureaucracies. 
In February of 1978, flight controllers working in Bermuda regained some 
communication with the dying space station.  They frantically moved to many centers across the 
world over the next summer, only to learn that in December NASA cancelled the mission to 
revisit Skylab.13  This happened despite the efforts of men like George Jeffs, a Vice President of 
the Apollo Command/Service Module at North American Rockwell Corporation, who wanted to 
reboost the workshop with another CSM.14  Now all that was left for controllers was to try to 
predict where it would land.  Vance Brand and Don Lind trained to use a CSM to reposition the 
workshop for a better return area.15  They instead had a small amount of power left in the station 
to try to reposition it for a better landing. 
On July 12, 1979, Skylab met the Earth.  The decaying orbit sent the station falling down 
over the western portion of Australia and into the surrounding waters, slightly off the predicted 
fall.  Luckily for everyone involved, pieces landed only in sparsely populated areas of a friendly 
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nation.  Skylab had completed 34,980 orbits and left a debris field 40 by 2,400 miles [64 by 
3,860 kilometers].  Collected pieces went to NASA for examination.16  A casual observer can 
now find pieces of it for sale on eBay occasionally. 
After Skylab, NASA moved on to the nine-day mission of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, 
in which Vance Brand (Skylab backup and rescue astronaut) and Deke Slayton (of the Original 
Seven) finally flew in space.17  For NASA, however, the future lay in the new, reusable, space 
shuttle.  In fact, some engineers and scientists tried to move straight from Apollo to the shuttle 
project, thinking that anything else was a dead end and a waste of time.18  The new shuttle 
brought some of the public’s interest back, since NASA was again seen as on the cutting-edge. 
Of the nine Skylab astronauts, only Owen Garriott, Jack Lousma, and Paul Weitz flew in 
space again, this time in the shuttle.  Weitz maintained that he went through the same basic 
training for both Skylab and the shuttle, that not much had changed.19  Garriott said that while 
the launch of the Saturn rocket and the shuttle were relatively the same, the re-entry was 
completely different.20  Of course, for Skylab they landed in a capsule in the water, whereas the 
shuttle landed like a glider on a runway.  On the other hand, Lousma indicated that the launches 
were actually very different.  The Saturn rocket was a stop-and-go launch because of the stages, 
but the shuttle was a continuous movement out of the atmosphere.21  Obviously there were some 
major changes between the two projects, but each seemed to adapt well to the new format.  Such 
adaptations are the key to survival at NASA.  For the time being, at least, the shuttle was here to 
stay.  The days of the one-shot-only spacecraft would not be revisited for some time. 
To summarize, as Dale Myers, the Associate Administrator of the Johnson Space Center 
during Skylab, says, “I don’t think Skylab ever gets the credit it should get.  It was just an 
immensely productive program.”22  The conclusion of Skylab brought at least some controversy 
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in the ranks of the NASA employees.  Those in charge wanted to move on to the seemingly 
endless possibilities of the shuttle rather than stay with a potential workhorse space station.  In 
the end, perhaps the legacy of Skylab are the extremely productive experiments, many of which 
have never been duplicated.   
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LESSONS LEARNED 
From the beginning, NASA designed Skylab as a program that would lead to other 
projects.  Since the main objectives of Skylab were science and research, many of the outcomes 
focus on those two fields.  The space station naturally led to groundbreaking achievements and 
new ways for NASA to run missions in the future.  This section will highlight a few of the most 
important lessons learned. 
After each mission, a crew debriefing allowed for the assimilation of some lessons 
learned.  As an example, the astronauts could learn from Kerwin, who became seasick after 
splashdown, most likely because he drank a cherry drink.1  He also suggested that for the 
following missions non-essential teleprinter messages should be transmitted only once or twice a 
day, rather than continuously interrupting the astronauts’ course of work.2  The first crew 
mentioned that food palatability in space tended to be more extreme than on Earth, either 
negatively or positively.3  The second crew specifically highlighted their conversations with their 
families as very positive.4  The third crew, as might be expected, mentioned a few aspects that 
could be handled better.  They asked for more flexibility with the flight controllers.5  Pogue 
remarked that the controllers were too impersonal in their interactions with the crew members.6  
Each crew brought its own perspective and certainly future missions can learn from their 
experiences.   
In fact, the space agency embarked on a systematic lessons-learned program beginning 
with Skylab on April 30, 1974.  NASA employees concluded, among other things, that they 
needed a system to verify teleprinter messages and to make sure that they had received the 
complete message.7  Also, for future missions, mission control could work equipment or 
experiments while the crew was asleep or eating for even more scientific output.8  During 
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mission control team meetings, the presence of a Public Affairs Officer helped the dissemination 
of accurate information to the press.9  NASA also found that, other than low humidity, 
habitability conditions were acceptable.10  Finally, the paper suggested an hour of non-activity 
before sleep for the crew.11  Again, is just a sample of the many lessons learned.  
On July 18, 1974, NASA compiled another list of lessons learned.  For instance, the 
presence of man in space as an observer and a repairman proved invaluable to the Skylab 
program.12  The lack of a video uplink taught the agency the need for such capability, especially 
to teach the crew repair procedures.13  While the food was better than on previous missions, a 
lack of variety led to an idea for a “pantry-style food storage system” which would allow 
astronauts to select their desired food for the day.14  In the area of clothing, a shirt and pants were 
preferable to a suit for comfort.15  Skylab also could be considered in some ways a turning point 
in the area of Extravehicular Activities.  It showed the importance of foot and body restraints 
both inside and outside the vehicle.  NASA also found that standardization was the key to 
successful EVAs.16   
NASA later released, on June 5, 1984, a thirty-two page booklet listing the lessons 
learned on a wide variety of aspects of the Skylab mission. This included the finding that “good 
muscular condition required at least an hour a day of deliberate exercise per man.”17  This was 
key to maintaining the health of crews on long-duration missions.  NASA also concluded that 
large windows for observation of the Earth were good for crew morale and relaxation.  
Repeatedly stated, the window was often the most popular area during any time of relaxation for 
each of the crews.18  International Space Station designers have integrated this concept in their 
plans. 
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For the first time in NASA’s history someone other than CapCom talked to the Skylab 
astronauts while they flew in space.  At one point in the third mission, Dr. Robert M. McQueen, 
a Flight Surgeon, spoke with Gibson about one of the experiments.19  While this type of 
interaction had never occurred before, it now is more commonplace.  Flight surgeons now speak 
directly to the astronauts somewhat frequently while they fly in space.   
The relationship between scientists and astronauts changed for the better during Skylab 
missions.  Before they flew, those in charge of experiments tended to doubt whether or not the 
astronauts could complete the experiments correctly.  By the end of the missions, the scientists 
seemed surprisingly pleased with the dedication of the astronauts and even thanked them for 
their hard work.20  Indeed, Dr. Kerwin felt as though they were not guinea pigs, but rather co-
investigators.21  Probably the most skeptical of all scientists participating in this mission were the 
solar astronomers who did not want the astronauts to be in charge of pointing the ATM at the 
sun.  In the end, however, Harry Cooper acknowledges that the scientists “were delighted at the 
way every time anything interesting occurred on the sun…the astronauts had focused on it.”22  
Perhaps this relationship changed for the scientists and experimenters once NASA began 
accepting scientist-astronauts and striving for research in space.  Certainly the hard work and 
commitment to their mission helped cement this affinity. 
When asked what were the most important contributions of Skylab to NASA, the 
astronauts answered in a variety of ways.  Carr maintained that they helped most in the field of 
medical studies, especially by living for an extended period of time in microgravity.23  Kerwin 
stated that they aided most “the habitability, the diet and exercise, and the workday structure” for 
any future missions such as the International Space Station.24  Garriott listed such contributions 
as the solar observations, long duration weightlessness, the importance of exercise in 
 78
microgravity, and the idea that artificial gravity may not be necessary for future missions to 
places like Mars.25  Finally, Conrad asserted that the main lesson was that practical applications 
of Skylab, such as Earth observations and a computerized inventory, proved that NASA could 
benefit all mankind.26  A variety of important discoveries resulted from America’s first space 
station.   
With Skylab, NASA also realized that it could perform meaningful programs on a smaller 
budget.27  Through the Apollo program, the United States Government had allocated almost any 
amount of money and resources needed for reaching the Moon.  The federal government still has 
not matched this level of spending.  The ability to work on a tighter budget would become 
critical to the space agency. 
During Skylab, the different NASA centers around the country also had to learn how to 
communicate more effectively and how to work together to accomplish common goals.  After 
NASA became aware of the problems during the launch of Skylab, many of the centers pulled 
together to learn how to fix them.  Certainly, Huntsville and Houston received the most 
recognition for the work, but many of the others contributed as well.  As some Skylab 
personalities, such as Garriott and Kerwin, have said, the level of cooperation has never been 
matched.  Garriott called it “sort of the golden era” of inter-center cooperation.28  From the 
beginning of Skylab, the amount of interaction among centers was greater than it had been 
during any previous program.  The project originated at the Marshall Space Flight Center in 
Huntsville, but also included major contributions from Houston and Cape Canaveral.  Today’s 
success in cooperation among NASA centers may not be as remarkable as it was during Skylab, 
but one certainly can consider the inter-center relationship more efficient than it was in the time 
before the space station. 
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The Skylab missions also taught NASA some key lessons on habitability.  The 
adaptability of clothing and the necessity for more comfortable attire led to changes in the post-
Skylab wardrobe of astronauts in space.29  Also for the first time each astronaut had an individual 
sleeping compartment, due to the increased volume of the station.30  While today’s astronauts 
may not benefit from the same luxury, the idea of the need for privacy at certain times still holds 
true.  For the most part, the astronauts agreed that the food on Skylab was much better than on 
previous missions.  This resulted mainly from the addition of food warmers.  Even so, the final 
two crews to Skylab learned from one mistake by the first crew.  Since taste buds are not as 
effective in the microgravity of space, the second and third crews took with them more Tabasco 
Sauce to add some taste to the food.31  Tabasco Sauce, salsa, and salt are still main ingredients to 
enhance the flavor of food in space.  A habitability study based on Skylab in 1977 recommended 
only a ten-hour workday for future missions.32  This recommendation has not always been 
followed.  The same study also recommended a ninety-day maximum for future missions.33  This 
standard obviously was not adhered to since the current record is over four hundred days, though 
most of the over-ninety-day missions are Russian.  Indeed, most ISS crews now stay in space 
more than twice that recommended time. 
Marlowe Cassetti listed a number of lessons learned from this mission.  First, the MOCR 
computers had keyboards rather than just buttons, which allowed for more interactions by the 
mission controllers.  This key change to Mission Control greatly changed space flight from the 
ground’s perspective.  The addition of satellite relays allowing for more contact between the 
controllers and the workshop was another important change for future missions.  Finally, NASA 
learned the potential effectiveness of astronauts in troubleshooting.  The first crew especially, 
with the deployment of the parasol and the releasing of the solar panels, proved the usefulness of 
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humans in space.  Cassetti directly relates this achievement to the use of astronauts twenty years 
later in the repair of the Hubble telescope.34   
Other flight controllers have noted some lessons from Skylab.  Eugene Kranz said that 
NASA learned an important lesson about the psychology of long-term space flights.35  They are 
inherently different than the short-term missions of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo.  Skylab was a 
marathon compared to the relative sprints of earlier missions.  One could apply this change to the 
current International Space Station.  Phil Shaffer claimed that “it produced a tremendous amount 
of very valuable information about the Earth and about the sun and about space flight and about 
the human physiology, metals and materials, etc, etc.”36  In other words. Skylab’s lessons 
crossed into almost every area of space flight.  Two of the flight directors, Milton Windler and 
Chuck Lewis, stressed the importance of the “Science Czar.”  He served as someone who could 
work with both the flight controllers and the scientists, so that the flight directors did not have to 
make decisions on the importance of different scientific experiments.37  Bob Parker and later Bill 
Lenoir served in this position and helped to stop potential quarrels between those two 
communities. 
Ed Fendell points to two major lessons from Skylab that may be applied to the ISS.  Due 
to the long hours, the attrition rate of mission control was much worse than on the shorter 
missions.  On a more positive note, NASA can learn something from Skylab about how to collect 
and process large amounts of data.38  For more lessons that apply to the space station, Tommy 
Holloway, a member of flight planning, tried to learn from the mistakes of the mission control 
scheduling so that in the future people will not have to work as many “odd hours” and can have 
“more of a family life.”39  George Franklin of the Spacecraft Design Division added that, 
because of Skylab, they realized that astronauts could sleep just about anywhere when in space.40  
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Perhaps this concept has attributed to the lack of personal living areas on either the shuttle or 
space station.  John Aaron believed they learned to slow down the planning on long duration 
missions so as not to overload the astronauts.41  They also learned how to maintain a station in 
orbit through EVAs and other methods, and that the ISS has hand holds for EVAs due to 
problems with Skylab.42  Finally, Kenneth Kleinknecht stated that Skylab taught NASA 
engineers many lessons about testing systems, notably environmental testing, for future, and 
especially long-duration, missions.43 
There are also some lessons that NASA should have learned from the experience of 
Skylab, but instead have become repeated mistakes in subsequent missions.  Kenneth Young 
pointed out one in particular.  Those who schedule the astronauts onboard the ISS did not learn 
from Skylab that they cannot schedule every moment of the astronauts’ time.44  Flight controllers 
must allow some leeway in the astronauts’ itinerary.  John Aaron says that NASA did not learn 
the importance of volume when making a space station.  Volume helps with waste management 
and noise reduction, among other things.  NASA administrators, when working on the design of 
the ISS, instead listened to the fallacy that higher volume translates to higher cost.45  All of the 
lessons described here, those accepted and rejected, should have the potential to educate 
everyone involved in future space flight in an attempt to avoid past mistakes. 
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CONCLUSION 
While the collective Skylab missions themselves only lasted almost a year, their effects 
are long lasting.  Enormous amounts of data came from the numerous scientific experiments and 
other research aspects of the mission.  Likewise, the ability of the astronauts to criticize flaws 
and make suggestions for the future led to more productive missions.  The men went on to take 
part in many organizations, but generally they stayed close to the space agency.  NASA even 
asked some of them for help when designing the International Space Station.  One could even 
say that the lessons learned on Skylab proved invaluable to the ISS and that it could not have 
been constructed without the previous experience on Skylab.  Most importantly, these men 
demonstrated that humans could last through long duration missions in microgravity.  Through 
dedication to reach a goal and teamwork, they successfully completed what should be the first in 
a long legacy of human long duration endeavors in space.  These men, from various regions of 
the country and from different socioeconomic backgrounds, came together to make a lasting 
mark on America’s space program.  These missions were not wasted ventures, but rather gave 
more understanding of the human condition.  May humanity never lose its zeal to conquer the 
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Skylab 2  .Skylab 3  Skylab 4  
Activity 
Hrs. % Hrs % Hrs % 
Medical 145.3 7.5% 312.5 8.0% 366.7 6.1% 
Solar Observations 117.2 6.0% 305.1 7.8% 519.0 8.6% 
Earth Resources 71.4 3.7% 223.5 5.7% 274.5 4.5% 
Other Experiments 65.4 3.4% 243.6 6.2% 403.0 6.7% 
Sleep, Rest 675.6 34.7% 1224.5 31.2% 1846.5 30.5% 
Pre/post Sleep, Eating 477.1 24.5% 975.7 24.9% 1384.0 22.9% 
Housekeeping 103.6 5.3% 158.4 4.0% 298.9 4.9% 
Training, Hygiene 56.2 2.9% 202.2 5.2% 384.5 6.4% 
Other (EVA) 232.5 12.0% 279.7 7.1% 571.4 9.4% 
Total 1944.3  3925.2  6048.5  
 








Date Astronauts Purpose Duration 
5/25/1973 Weitz Stand-up EVA 0:33 
6/7/1973 Conrad and Kerwin Free Solar Array 4:31 
6/19/1973 Conrad and Weitz Replace ATM film 1:37 
8/6/1973 Garriott and Lousma Deploy permanent heat shield and replace ATM film 6:31 
8/24/1973 Garriott and Lousma Replace ATM film 4:30 
9/22/1973 Bean and Garriott Retrieve parasol sample and replace ATM film 2:42 
11/22/1973 Pogue and Gibson Replace ATM film 6:33 
12/25/1973 Carr and Pogue Replace ATM film and photograph comet 6:51 
12/29/1973 Carr and Gibson Retrieve micrometeoroid shield piece and photograph comet 3:30 







AAP – Apollo Applications Program 
AES – Apollo Extension System 
AM – Airlock Module 
ASTP – Apollo-Soyuz Test Project 
ATM – Apollo Telescope Mount 
CapCom – Capsule Communicator 
CBRM – Charger Battery Relay Module 
CMG – Control Moment Gyro 
CSM – Command/Service Module 
DoD – Department of Defense 
EECOM – Electrical, Environmental and Communications 
EGIL – Electrical, General Instrumentation, and Life Support System 
EREP  - Earth Resources Experiment Package 
EVA – Extravehicular Activity 
EXP – Experiments officer 
FIDO – Flight Dynamics Officer 
FLIGHT – Flight Director 
FOD – Flight Operations Director 
FOMR – Flight Operations Management Room 
GNS or GNC – Guidance Navigation and Control System 
GSFC – Goddard Space Flight Center 
GUIDO – Guidance Officer 
HQTRS – Headquarters 
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INCO – Instrumentation and Communication Officer 
ISS – International Space Station 
IVA – Intravehicular Activity 
JSC – Johnson Space Center 
LM – Lunar Module 
LV – Launch Vehicle officer 
MDA – Multiple Docking Adapter 
MED OPS – Medical Operations 
MMU – Manned Maneuvering Unit 
MOCR – Mission Operations Control Room 
MOL – Manned Orbiting Laboratory 
MSC – Manned Spacecraft Center 
MSFC – Marshall Space Flight Center 
NACA – National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NETWORK – Network controller 
NOAA – National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
O&P – Operations and Procedures 
OWS – Orbital Workshop 
PAO – Public Affairs Officer 
POCC – Payload Operations Control Center 
ROTC – Reserve Officer Training Corps 
SCH – Space Center Houston 
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SKYCOM – Skylab Communications 
SMAG – Space Medicine Advisory Group 
SMEAT – Skylab Medical Experiment Altitude Test 
SPAN – Spacecraft Performance Analysis room 
TELMU – Telemetry, Electrical, EVA Mobility Unit officer 
USAF – United States Air Force 
USMC – United States Marine Corps 
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